Since James Soong (宋楚瑜) returned to Taiwan, speculation about possible cooperation between him and Lien Chan (連戰) has arisen again. Especially after the departure of Lee Teng-hui's (李登輝) underlings from the KMT's power nucleus, it seems that cooperation between the KMT and PFP (People First Party) is not unlikely as Lee, the major obstacle, is no longer there.
Inter-party cooperation includes campaign and issue-based alliances. The high-profile cooperation between the KMT and PFP, however, is not for promoting issues. Such cooperation occurred frequently when the KMT, DPP and New Party were the major parties.
A more salient part of DPP-PFP cooperation is whether the two can cooperate in decision-making at the Legislative Yuan and put forward common candidates for future mayoral and county commissioner elections.
But before Soong's return, the KMT passed a very harsh article at its Extraordinary National Congress to shut Soong out of elections for the party's Central Committee and chairmanship. What's more, the KMT started membership re-registration immediately after the Extraordinary National Congress to kick out pro-Soong members. Neither new chairman Lien Chan nor the five vice chairpersons have any close relationship with Soong. Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), the only potential go-between for the two, ranked just seventh in the election of the Central Standing Committee. Former Kaohsiung Mayor Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) was not even elected. Their defeats have made cooperation between Lien and Soong even more difficult. So far, most of the people willing to bring Lien and Soong together are KMT members, especially the former speaker of the Taiwan provincial assembly Liu Ping-wei (劉炳偉), a close friend of Soong. But these people are not influential enough to act as matchmakers.
One obstacle to the Lien-Soong match is the difficulty in measuring the KMT and PFP's respective political clout. Despite Lien's placement behind Soong in the presidential election, the KMT occupies 19 more seats than the PFP at the Legislative Yuan. Moreover, the PFP is unlikely to gain more than 50 seats in next year's legislative election thereby remaining unable to beat the KMT. Since the KMT can maintain its majority in the Legislature, it hardly needs to subordinate itself to Soong and have its chairman run in the presidential election as his running mate.
More importantly, many KMT cadres think the party does not have to subordinate itself to Soong since it does not need Soong as badly as Soong needs it. The PFP, after all, is a "one-man" party. Should Soong lose the 2004 presidential election and consequently fade from the political scene, the PFP may well be doomed to dissolution. If so, the KMT and the DPP would form a two-party political system.
In the long-term, the KMT might help the DPP win the 2004 presidential election by refusing to cooperate with the PFP. By doing so, it can stop Soong and his underlings from returning to the KMT's power center and prevent the PFP from gaining political clout. By foregoing victory in the 2004 election and minimizing Soong's electoral chances, the KMT will have the DPP as its only competitor in the 2008 presidential election.
KMT-PFP cooperation in the mayoral and commissioner elections will not be easy, either. After all, these positions are elected simultaneously and mayoral and commissioner candidates are required to help candidates for city and county councilors from their own parties. Given the situation, it will be very hard for the KMT and PFP to nominate the same candidates and at the same time in order to avoid competition between their parties. The Kaohsiung mayoral election in 1994 and Taipei mayoral election in 1998 are good examples. Knowing that the odds were against it, the New Party was compelled to nominate its candidates in these two election to promote the electoral chances of its councilor candidates. Whether the KMT and the PFP will avoid repeating the mistake depends on whether they can survive their upcoming trials.
Julian Kuo is an associate professor of political science at Soochow University.
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