If North Korea carries out a nuclear test, tension will soar and the prospect of talks with the US and other regional powers could fade for a long time. So the North's recent expression of interest in talks suggests it might refrain from such a provocative act for now.
North Korea's history of belligerent behavior dates to its 1950 invasion of US-backed South Korea, triggering a war that killed millions. But today, North Korea is weak and isolated, lacking fuel and spare parts for its aging conventional weaponry. Its leader, Kim Jong-il, likely knows that a nuclear test -- an aggressive tactic designed to win concessions -- might backfire, ruffling friendlier nations such as China and Russia and inviting a punitive response from Washington and its allies.
This month, US officials said spy satellites spotted tunnels being dug and the construction of a reviewing stand in northeastern North Korea, possible preparations for a nuclear test that would sharpen the dispute over the North's manufacture of atomic bombs.
Late on Thursday, North Korea denied reports that it might be preparing a nuclear test.
"The US leadership has recently ... come out with a fabrication that there are some kind of missile tests and signs of an underground nuclear test," said the Korean Central Television Station, the North's only nationwide network.
The North Korean quandary is likely to be a prominent topic when US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and regional defense ministers meet at an annual forum in Singapore from Thursday until Sunday. The North Koreans were invited, but are not expected to attend.
In a keynote speech at the forum, South Korean Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung will "deliver South Korea's position on the North Korean nuclear issue and appeal for international support," the defense ministry in Seoul said.
Yoon will also discuss the security situation on the Korean Peninsula with his counterparts.
Solution
South Korea and its chief ally, the US, want the peninsula to be free of nuclear weapons and seek a peaceful, diplomatic solution to the standoff. The South, however, takes a conciliatory approach toward the North, while US policy and pronouncements tend to be tougher.
Kim Jong-il's goal is to preserve a destitute regime whose totalitarian character has barely changed since his late father and predecessor, Kim Il-sung, founded North Korea in 1948. To do that, he needs economic aid from the outside world, the West in particular.
Negotiations are vital to that strategy, though three rounds of six-party talks in Beijing on curbing North Korea's nuclear know-how ended inconclusively. Dictator Kim, who lives in luxury in Pyongyang palaces as the populace starves and doesn't have to worry about being voted out of office, seems willing to wait out, or wear down, his adversaries. A nuclear test, however, would inflame the standoff and possibly alienate China, North Korea's last ally.
Kurt Campbell, former US assistant secretary of defense for Asia in the Clinton administration, has said that it could lead South Korea and Japan to rethink their current policy against nuclear arsenals.
"The potential downside of a test is enormous," he said. "It would set off a chain reaction in the region with completely impossible-to-predict consequences."
Last Tuesday, North Korea reiterated that it wanted to resolve the issue peacefully and through dialogue, though it also scolded the US, saying the superpower's "hostile" policies led Pyongyang to develop a "nuclear deterrent."
Recent diplomacy, including inter-Korean talks on the border and contacts between US and North Korean officials at the UN in New York, suggests the push for negotiations has some momentum. The US has urged North Korea to return to six-party talks, says it recognizes Pyongyang's sovereignty and has no plans to attack to unseat Kim.
North Korea is so secretive that experts can only speculate whether the satellite data proves North Korea is preparing a test, or is just making moves to scare Washington and others into making concessions in any talks.
A test could serve Kim Jong-il at home, reinforcing his personality cult and invigorating the military and other followers who take pride in North Korea's armaments and defiance towards its No. 1 foe, the US.
But it would be a big gamble, possibly rupturing Pyongyang's pattern of dealing with the outside world: a combination of talks, threats and enigmatic silence aimed at extracting material support.
The US might try to rally support at the UN for economic sanctions, and goodwill in South Korea toward its neighbor could dry up, at least temporarily.
Animosity
A test would strengthen the hand of hardliners in Japan, where animosity toward the North is high because of the lack of progress on Japan's demands for more information about Japanese citizens kidnapped by the communist country decades ago.
Even so, it is far from certain that South Korea and China, major suppliers of food and other aid to North Korea, would support sanctions that could undermine North Korea and destabilize their borders. Neither wants a flood of refugees far poorer than the East Germans who fled as soon as the Berlin Wall came down.
"It seems that there is a concern that actually cutting off these lifelines to the North, be they fuel or food, could push the North over the edge, could further destabilize North Korea," said Peter Beck, director of the North East Asia Project for the International Crisis Group in Seoul.
Keiji Kobayashi, professor of international studies at Kyushu International University in Japan, said economic sanctions would have "very little overall impact" without Chinese support.
A test would confirm North Korea's status as a nuclear power, but the political gains are unclear. One of Kim Jong-il's few bargaining chips is the mystery surrounding his nuclear activities, a source of anxiety and bewilderment in capitals around the world.
Kim might choose to keep everyone guessing.
Christopher Torchia was Seoul bureau chief for The Associated Press from 1999 until last year.
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