British Prime Minister Tony Blair has achieved a remarkable third successive electoral victory. But his sharply reduced majority in the House of Commons, and his damaged personal reputation, mean that his political position is seriously weakened. As a result, he will be poorly placed to handle the challenges ahead, the most intractable of which will be the EU's new Constitution.
The Constitution, adopted by the 25 member states last year, is not, in itself, a big deal. It introduces some significant improvements for majority voting in the Council of Ministers. It gives some more powers to the European Parliament. It includes a Charter of Fundamental Rights. It might help harmonize the foreign policies of the member states. But it is no revolutionary document.
According to normal British constitutional practice, the government would be expected to ratify this Constitution by a vote in the House of Commons; and, until the recent general election, the government's huge majority should have been more than sufficient. But Blair, beset by controversy over the unpopular and possibly illegal war in Iraq, thought he could avoid trouble at Westminster by postponing ratification until next year (that is, a comfortably long time in the future), and proposing that it be carried out by popular referendum.
ILLUSTRATION: YU SHA
Unfortunately, as things stand, this is a referendum that Blair will not win, because all polls show a large and solid majority against the European Constitution.
Blair's government may hope to be rescued by outside events. France will hold a referendum on the Constitution for the end of this month, and a French "no," the British seem to think, might make their problem go away. For the general expectation is that if France rejects the Constitution, the Constitution would be dead, and no British referendum would be needed.
If this is Blair's calculation, he is mistaken. Moreover, it is the kind of mistake that the British have been making in relations with Europe for the past half-century.
Some recent French polls now show a majority in favor of the Constitution. But even if the French do vote "no," that will not solve the British problem: on the contrary, it will precipitate a major political crisis, in France and across Europe, concerning the future of the EU -- the type of crisis that the British have spent 50 years trying to evade. For if the Constitution is indeed dead, what happens next?
None of the leading members of the EU will be interested in Britain's views on this question. When Blair swept to power in 1997, he was widely welcomed throughout Europe as the most pro European British prime minister since Edward Heath a quarter of a century earlier. He spoke French and seemed at ease with Britain's neighbors across the Channel; more importantly, he seemed to sympathize with European integration. Eight years on, Europe knows better.
It is now clear to all that Blair is fundamentally opposed to the idea of a more politically integrated Europe. Not only has he kept Britain out of the single European currency over the past four years, he made it clear during the election campaign that he does not expect the UK to join the euro during the next five years either.
Occasionally Blair flirts with the idea of more European cooperation on foreign policy and defense. But the past three years proved in practice that he prefers subservience to the security policy of US President George W. Bush to any sense of community with Europe. In short, Blair is as opposed to the European project as all his predecessors.
One fundamental difference between France and Britain is that most of the mainstream political elite in France has long been broadly pro-European. If the French electorate votes "no," it will be much less a vote against the Constitution than a protest vote against President Jacques Chirac, or an expression of anxiety about the implications of the EU's enlargement to Central Europe.
By contrast, Blair cannot win a referendum on the Constitution, not only because it is opposed by virtually all the popular press, but also because neither he nor any major political leader in Britain has ever had a good word to say about European integration.
The crisis over the EU's future direction triggered by a French "no" vote could last for some time. But if the British imagine that the Constitution will just die, and that that will be the end of the story, they are deceiving themselves.
On the contrary, they will find themselves embroiled, like the rest of Europe, in a fundamental debate about the objectives of the union. They will then be forced to make public and explicit choices about the sort of Europe that they want, and this will put them at odds with their neighbors.
In the end, the French and other leading member states are likely to explore alternative ways of working towards a more politically integrated Europe. The most plausible institutional mechanism for this alternative way forward will be the existing grouping of those member states that have wanted to belong to a more united Europe by joining, or seeking to join, the euro zone. If the Constitution is rejected, the British, having chosen to stay out of that grouping, may find that they have maneuvered themselves into an even more remote outer circle of Europe.
Ian Davidson is an adviser to, and a columnist for, the European Policy Center, Brussels. A former columnist for the Financial Times, his most recent book is Voltaire in Exile.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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