On May 5, US President George W. Bush called Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤).
That Bush chose to call Hu to discuss cross-strait affairs on the first day of People First Party Chairman James Soong's (
It emphasizes US concern, as well as the US' right to make pronouncements, on the cross-strait issue.
In telling Hu that Beijing should engage in dialogue with President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), Bush was also underlining that the best route between Beijing and Taipei is via Washington, and that if either side crossed the "red line," it will incur US displeasure.
All this goes to show that while the phone call was used to show mutual concern, it is also a prop for political posturing between leaders on both sides.
The crux of Hu's chat with Bush was that an appropriate resolution to the cross-strait issue was critical to the healthy development of Sino-US relations. Hu emphasized that Taiwan was an important link in the development of China-US relations, and that the basis of these relations was creating a situation in which neither side benefited exclusively from Taiwan.
This wording strongly suggests that if the US seeks to win the initiative and control in the Taiwan Strait, it would also have to contend with China, for China is certainly not prepared to take a passive role in the region.
China believes that only by retaining the initiative will it be in a position to interpret and initiate action. If it cannot do so, then it will be forced into a passive stance. For this reason, now that the disturbance over the "Anti-Secession" Law has died down, and both Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) and Soong have visited, China is clearly pushing aside the US and boldly setting itself up as its own master.
Hu went on to say that he hoped that the US would support the improvement in cross-strait relations with a constructive attitude, and support efforts to achieve peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. When Hu talks about a "constructive attitude," he seems to be hinting that the US should act with true concern for the international situation and not simply out of national interest.
The subtext of Hu's remarks seems to be that while China welcomes US concern about Taiwan, it does not welcome hypocritical interference.
In speaking with Hu, Bush expressed the hope that Hu would "reach out" to Chen. The desire is to broaden the spectrum over which Hu can connect with Taiwan, reaching out a hand toward Chen and the Democratic Progressive Party in an effort to truly resolve the cross-strait issue.
The efforts by the opposition to "build bridges" has been characterized by Chen was "seeking a way toward resolution," in the hope that these visits might present new opportunities. If the trips by Lien and Soong do indeed pave the way for dialogue between Chen and Hu, then they may have had some effect. If they don't, they will have had little significance.
When Bush spoke of Chen as Taiwan's "duly elected" president, he was clearly providing him with support and reducing his isolation amid his troubles. The real question regarding the Bush-Hu conversation is how Chen will be able to make use of the support offered to him by Bush, whether Hu will accept the goodwill offered by Bush, and whether they can work together to resolve cross-strait difficulties.
Li Hua-chiu is a part-time researcher with the National Policy Foundation.
Translated by Ian Bartholomew
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