Yesterday Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan (
Just as Lien's preparations for his visit were almost complete, Hu authorized Taiwan Affairs Office Director Chen Yunlin (
With both Lien and Soong visiting China in such a short period of time, the significance of the former's visit will be greatly reduced. As the chairman of an opposition party, Lien is not authorized to make any agreements with the Chinese, so his ability to contribute meaningfully to promoting cross-strait relations or consolidating cross-strait peace is sharply limited. We therefore should not have unrealistic expectations of what Lien could achieve.
Soong goes to China with the support of the 10-point consensus between himself and President Chen Shui-bian (
On March 4, Hu even made a statement expressing approval of the Chen-Soong 10-point consensus, saying that this could be a viable basis for negotiations with Taiwan. Whether Hu is attempting to allay Chen's suspicions by inviting Soong, and is pushing for a basis for interaction with Chen, is worth further exploration.
The US attitude toward Lien and Soong's visit has zigged and zagged. Randall Schriver, the US deputy assistant secretary of state in charge of China and Taiwan issues made statements on April 6 and April 19 that he hopes that recent developments will not lead to an even deeper split between Taiwan's political parties.
After China invited Soong, the US changed its attitude toward the proposed visits, saying that they believed that negotiations were the best way of easing cross-strait tensions.
The key factor here is that China's invitation of Soong likely had a considerable impact on Washington's attitude. They now may believe that China isn't actively seeking to sow division in Taiwan, but rather, Beijing wants to keep open any channels of communication with Chen.
This interpretation was also reflected in Chen's shift in attitude toward the visits. Originally, he was highly critical, attacking Lien for "casting aside Taiwan now that he had China." On April 23 he changed his tune, saying that if Lien and Soong were able to speak directly with China's leaders and return with first-hand information, then they could be seen as seeking a new path in cross-strait relations. He therefore gave them his blessing. It was a complete turnaround for Chen.
Soong's planned visit has reduced the significance of Lien's trip, and Soong will be visiting within the context of his 10-point consensus with Chen. This seems to indicate that China has not rejected the idea of maintaining a channel of communication with Chen. This may be the key to the turnaround in both Chen and the US' response.
If this is correct, and if Soong has the full support of the US for his visit, then Lien will be completely marginalized, and Soong could help open a new phase in cross-strait interaction.
Tung Chen-yuan is an assistant professor at the National Chengchi University.
Translated by Ian Bartholomew
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