On March 14, the 10th National People's Congress passed the "Anti-Secession" Law, which officially endowed Beijing with the legal basis to resolve the issue concerning the Taiwan Strait with "non-peaceful means," setting the stage for possible military attacks against Taiwan in the future.
This move damaged the harmonious atmosphere between the two sides created by the charter passenger flights during the Lunar New Year, as well as the meeting between President Chen Shui-bian (
The US Department of State thinks that China is sending the wrong message at a crucial moment, and has asked that Beijing reconsider the law and express goodwill to Taiwan. The Japanese government has also clearly shown its opposition to any resolution by other than peaceful means. In troubled times for cross-strait relations, the question is: Where is Taiwan's own path?
First, Taiwan should squarely face China's intention to set the rules of the game. Chinese President Hu Jintao's (
Second, Taiwan should not underestimate the irrational element in China's decisions. The timing for Beijing's proposal of the law was unbelievable. It was not a time when the cross-strait situation was particularly tense. On the contrary, it was a rare turning point for improvement. Therefore, the absurd timing highlighted the serious delay and rigid nature of China's irrational decision-making.
Obviously, Beijing is unable to adjust itself to Taipei's flexible decisions, and cannot read the changeable political climate across the Strait. The Taiwanese authorities have to be fully aware of this, or they will put the country in danger.
Third, Taiwan should re-define the so-called "peaceful rising" of China. The "non-peaceful means" stated in the law makes a mockery of its "rising." Beijing tried to unilaterally dominate the direction of cross-strait relations during the legislation process, and ignored Washington's warning not to unilaterally change the status quo in the Strait. Beijing's hegemonism has severely threatened not only stability in East Asia but also security in the Asia-Pacific region.
Nevertheless, the most important task for Taiwan is in its own hands. As China's dual strategy becomes clearer, what will Taiwan's strategy be?
Honestly, I am afraid that the real situation in Taiwan is, "The doves dare not call for peace; the hawks dare not call for war." Taiwan is thus unable to propose a final plan regarding the development of cross-strait relations.
When confronted with a significant external problem, it is absolutely natural for the public to display a consensus. But Taiwan is an exception, because consolidating the public's general will is the most difficult thing. Even in the face of the external pressure brought by the law, political parties have made interpretations and responses in accordance with their own needs. Any external pressure can be turned into an internal conflict.
Western countries sympathize with Taiwan's situation. They are unhappy with China's hegemonic oppression and are willing to help Taiwan strive for favorable conditions at this dangerous moment.
But how can the ruling and opposition camps strive for Taiwan's interests if they cannot even reach a consensus on resisting external aggression?
Apollo Chen is the chief executive officer of the Taiwan Vitality Foundation.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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