When the National People's Congress convened in Beijing last week, Premier Wen Jiabao (
The US and Europe have grown apart and no presidential visit will change that. Europe won't be supplementing the US-led garrison in Iraq, for instance. But Washington might be able to convince Europe not to lift its ban on arms sales to China.
The fact that the interests of sovereign nations -- even ones with historical connections -- sometimes diverge shouldn't surprise anyone. Nevertheless, the US and Europe share a number of interests, including preserving their generally free and prosperous societies. No American or European wants to see the rise of a global hegemonic authoritarian power like China.
There's much good that has happened to the People's Republic of China (PRC) over the last three decades. However, further liberalization is by no means guaranteed. And even a more democratic China might be aggressively nationalistic.
That wouldn't be so important if the country was Myanmar or Zimbabwe, two other states under an EU arms embargo. But Beijing is likely to eventually marry the world's largest population with the largest economy. Even that needn't be frightening. After all, there were sometimes significant tensions between a rising US and declining Britain, but they ultimately forged one of the closest international relationships in existence.
With China, however, the differences are more significant, and these differences could conceivably lead to war. Should conflict come, it would be in the interests of Europe that the US prevail.
The EU implemented an arms embargo after the Chinese regime's slaughter of demonstrators in Tiananmen Square. But European firms see potential profits from servicing Beijing's growing desire for weapons. Some Europeans also hope to advance their goal of becoming a counterweight to the US.
The betting now is that the EU will drop the prohibition at its June meeting in Brussels. If Europe planned on becoming a military counterweight to China, Washington could say go ahead. But despite European talk of establishing an independent foreign policy, even leading nations like Germany have no intention of spending the money necessary to develop serious military capabilities. The obligation for real war fighting will remain America's.
Unfortunately, Beijing is thinking about war. Shi Yinhong (
And confrontation with Taiwan could lead to confrontation with the US, which means high-tech weapons sold by Europe could be used against the US. Some EU officials point to Israeli weapons transfers to Beijing, but that is no less an unfriendly act.
Others promise to limit the sort of weapons they sell. But that won't be much solace should conflict occur. French Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie has argued that European sales might slow Chinese development of its own capabilities. Actually, even European businesspeople worry that China wants to appropriate technology as much as acquire weapons.
It's hard to believe that any voluntary "code of conduct" would be effective. The best case has been made by British diplomats, who suggest creating a more limited but transparent export control regime.
It's true that European exports especially of dual-use technology to the PRC have been rising. Unfortunately, however, the British seem to be about the only ones who are talking about selling less rather than more. If Europe ignores US concerns, the administration's options are limited. The US could deny export licenses for sensitive defense sales to companies and nations that sell to China. Beyond that would be the threat of a full-scale trade war, which would be in no one's interest. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has called for a "new chapter" in relations.
Washington should acknowledge the legitimacy of EU disagreements with US policy and the wisdom of rethinking outmoded institutions, such as NATO. Most important, the US must recognize the commercial sacrifice it is asking of the Europeans, while convincing them to look beyond to a future in which China's positive role is by no means assured.
Washington needs to make the argument to individual governments as well as the European Commission, since the European public seems to be on Washington's side on this issue. Engagement is a better strategy than isolation for encouraging the development of a free China. However, engagement need not mean strengthening the PRC's military.
Beijing will become a significant military power with or without European arms sales. There's no need to hurry the process along.
Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant to the late US president Ronald Reagan. He is co-author of the recently released The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
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