What will be the impact of Beijing's proposed "anti-secession" law on Taiwanese businesspeople investing in China? This is a difficult question.
After the draft law was added to the agenda of the National People's Congress (NPC) in December, local media have often been denied interviews with these businesspeople regarding this sensitive issue. So there has been a lack of news coverage related to their insights. This highlights their tendency to "talk only about business when doing business," and not touch upon sensitive political issues.
Nevertheless, since there are a substantial number of renowned Taiwanese corporations in China, the question of whether the passage of the law will influence their support for government policies and cause other side effects deserves our attention.
Basically, not talking about politics has long been the rule for businesspeople in China to protect themselves. But as Beijing strictly enforces its policies against President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and Taiwan's independence, it has become more and more common for them to take sides.
Still, "sailing with the wind" has now become their primary strategy. Even those who support Chen often mention terms such as "the motherland" and the "peaceful unification of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait," and recognize Beijing's claims that, for example, independence separatist forces have seriously damaged and threatened cross-strait peace, the economy and trade.
Their awkward political situation in China is self-evident.
In terms of the law's impact on these businesspeople, while the bill's contents have not been revealed, as Theodor Huang (黃茂雄), chairman of the Chinese National Association of Industry and Commerce said, "It is impossible for Taiwanese businesspeople not to be affected by it."
In a press conference on May 24 last year, China's Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Spokesman Zhang Mingqing (
Meanwhile, China's local Taiwan affairs and united-front officials often hold parties for Taiwanese businesspeople on various holidays, and visit them in person. TAO officials also frequently attend conferences for these businesspeople. They stress that if the Chinese government does not "oppose and check the Taiwan independence secessionist forces and their activities resolutely," they will pose a severe threat to cross-strait business and operating rights, and will eventually damage social stability and economic development in Taiwan, as well as the fundamental interests of the Taiwanese people.
Beijing hopes that in this way the two sides can make a joint effort to combat separatism to maintain cross-strait stability, as well as cross-strait exchanges in the business and cultural sectors, among others.
Beijing also stresses to Taiwanese businesspeople that only by passing the law can China provide better conditions for investment, cross-strait cooperation and the opening of the "three links."
Under such a massive propaganda effort, Taiwanese businesspeople dare not say "no" to the law in public, even as it attempts to legalize military action against Taiwan.
What is worse, China is now actively moving to sway public opinion, claiming that Taiwan's businesspeople support the law. On Dec. 19, the Hong Kong Commercial Daily reported that Taiwanese industry leaders attach great importance to the passage of the law.
The chairman of a Taiwanese business association even said that Taiwanese businesspeople are not worried and won't withdraw their investments, and that the law will be helpful in easing cross-strait tensions, pushing the two sides to jointly solve the current predicament. All these maneuvers reveal nothing but Beijing's intention to push businesspeople to oppose Taiwan's independence.
Apart from this, Taiwan also needs to pay more attention to whether the law will include articles such as "praising all domestic and international organizations or activities that are beneficial to China's unification." Such an article would legalize Beijing's differential treatment of them.
Thus, with the passage of the law, China will be able -- legally -- to make strict tax and other inspections of pro-independence Taiwanese businesspeople. It will also be able to use business opportunities to push these businesspeople to oppose Taiwan independence or support the "one China" principle.
If this is the case, the law will cause a so-called "winter cicada" effect, as Taiwanese businesspeople will become as silent as winter cicadas.
On the other hand, those who intend to win China's support may express their stance through the media. This may affect not only how people in Taiwan view the government's China policy, but also our domestic consensus. Hence, an important task for the government is to strengthen communication with these people to win their support.
Su Yi is a China expert.
TRANSLATED BY LIN YA-TI AND EDDY CHANG
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