On Friday, Chinese President Hu Jintao (
Many commentators are wishfully interpreting Hu's talk as a sign of easing tensions in the Taiwan Strait. However, a closer look at the contents of Hu's speech, in the context of the bigger picture, indicates that Beijing has not budged an inch, while Chen has significantly backtracked on his position on Taiwan's sovereignty.
Those who defend Chen's 10-point consensus cite the need to ease tensions in the Strait given the pending passage of Beijing's so-called "anti-secession" law. It remains to be seen whether the hefty price that Chen paid to achieve consensus with Soong can buy him real cooperation with the PFP on important issues such as US arms procurement. However, in terms of winning over substantive goodwill from the other side of the Strait, Chen's compromises have hardly been worthwhile.
For one, the Chinese government remains unwavering on the "anti-secession" law. There is no sign that Beijing is even considering halting its passage, let along doing anything about the Chinese missiles targeting Taiwan.
As for Hu's talk, there is absolutely nothing new in it. He merely reiterated Beijing's cherished "one China" principle and its firm opposition to Taiwan independence. While he stress that China would "never give up on peaceful unification," the central point of the statement is still "unification." As for what happens when unification cannot be obtained through "peaceful" means, the Chinese missiles targeting Taiwan speak for themselves.
The other supposed "goodies" Hu handed out in his talk, in reality they are not "goodies" at all. For example, Hu indicated that the issue of the sale of agricultural products in China will be dealt with substantively. This is, for all practical purposes, a sugar-coated trap. The remark's intended audience is obvious Taiwan's farmers -- who are located primarily in the south, where support for independence runs high. So, this is in fact a transparent attempt to buy off Taiwan's farmers.
Moreover, it's no secret that the agricultural technologies of Taiwan are very advanced. Such technologies are badly needed in China -- where the income gap between the cities and rural farming regions has become a major source of social tension and instability. Clearly Beijing wants to reap the harvest of Taiwan's decades of hard work in building up its agricultural base, the same way it has benefitted from Taiwan's manufacturing and hi-tech industries.
As for Hu's comments about normalizing cross-strait links, he notably added the caveat that exchanges between "private groups" from each side would suffice -- thereby relegating such links to the status of domestic affairs.
In comparison, Chen's accord with Soong included substantive and major commitments. For one, Chen openly pledged that he would not push for changing the title of the country during the remainder of his term, and that any constitutional reform would require consensus between the governing and opposition parties. He also declared that he will respect the status of the country as defined by the Republic of China (ROC) Constitution. This is in reality an indirect acceptance of the "one China" principle.
During his talk, Hu bluntly warned Chen that Beijing expects him to take his "five noes" pledges seriously so that they are not just empty rhetoric. The question for Chen is this: What has he gotten in return for his commitments?
Sadly, the answer is "nothing."
KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun’s (鄭麗文) recent visit to Beijing and her upcoming visit to Washington will serve as a high-level test of her diplomatic mettle. In Beijing, Cheng was received with symbolic gestures, a warm reception, and high-level access. In Washington, she will receive far less pomp and far sharper questions about the KMT’s vision for the future of Taiwan. Her challenge will be to persuade Washington that the KMT’s engagement with China can coexist with strong deterrence. Cheng’s April 7-12 visit to mainland China coincided with an intense period of conflict in Iran. Despite the strategic significance of Cheng’s trip,
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has sent the vast Asian chemicals industry into a tailspin. Deprived of the likes of Qatari natural gas and Saudi Arabian oil, the region’s fertilizer and plastics plants are slowing production or even shutting down. Everywhere except China, that is. In petrochemicals, China is unique. As well as a traditional industry that uses oil and gas as feedstock, it has parallel output that relies on its abundant domestic coal. Unsurprisingly, India and other regional powers want to copy and paste the Chinese method. This would not be easy — or climate friendly. The
Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto says he knows how to fix the problems facing Indonesia. Yet his economic mismanagement and authoritarian tendencies are steering the nation toward a familiar mix of currency instability and political chaos. The world’s fourth-most populous nation risks reversing the hard-won democratic and business reforms that came after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. At that time, the rupiah collapsed and the political upheaval that followed forced former president Haji Mohamed Suharto from power. Prabowo’s administration is ignoring similar warning signs. That disconnect was apparent in a national address on Wednesday, when Prabowo projected the swagger that has
“Of course you can choose not to be Taiwanese, just do not stay here,” chairwoman of Taipei 101 operator Taipei Financial Center Corp Janet Chia (賈永婕) said in an online interview with local entertainer Tai Chih-yuan (邰智源), triggering intense discussion on social media, with politicians across party lines weighing in. In the interview, which was aired on May 14, Chia and Tai’s discussion over a meal in Taipei 101 covered Chia’s career change from entertainer to chairwoman and US climber Alex Honnold’s free solo climb up the Taipei 101 building. During the interview, Chia said, “Being on this land, we
RSS