I happened to be visiting Beijing when the China's leadership announced the draft "anti-secession law." The belief in China is that President Chen Shui-bian (
Yet this anti-secession legislation is likely to be as counterproductive as China's Taiwan Policy White Paper of 2000, reversing the trend of Taiwan assuming the weakest position in the triangular Taiwan-China-US relationship.
In 1999, the US became rather unsympathetic to Taiwan after former President Lee Teng-hui (
Taiwan's weak position was reversed when China issued its 2000 Taiwan Policy White Paper. In the white paper, China brought up three scenarios in which it would most likely take Taiwan by force. One of these scenarios stated that if Taiwan indefinitely refused to peacefully resolve the cross-strait dispute through negotiations, China could annex Taiwan militarily. This paper immediately generated a backlash in the US, which feared China might resort to force at any time to handle the "Taiwan issue."
Former US president Bill Clinton immediately warned Beijing that the US would continue to reject the use of force to solve the situation, and urged that any change in the status quo would require the Taiwanese people's consent. This turned the tables in Taiwan's favor, putting it in a stronger position than before.
When President Chen put forward the idea of "adopting a new constitution" and "holding a referendum on whether or not to write a new constitution," last year Taiwan again found itself in a disadvantageous position in the China-US-Taiwan relationship.
The US pressured Taiwan not to change the status quo, and claimed that Taiwan was not a sovereign nation. It also said that both sides must move toward "peaceful unification," that the US is not obligated to defend Taiwan and that Taiwan is part of China.
The details of the proposed anti-secession law have yet to be released, but its purpose is to show China's determination to fight against pro-independence forces. It is also a tool in negotiating with the US over the Taiwan issue, and serves as a counterbalance to the US' Taiwan Relations Act.
To demonstrate its anti-independence determination, China will have to deal with the definition of the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. It all boils down to how the Republic of China (ROC) is defined. It is no easy task, and if badly handled it could change the status quo. Taiwan might find a way around the line drawn by Beijing or it may lose restraint.
If China shows its determination to combat pro-independence forces, it must be backed up with the ability to act. In April, in a hearing on Taiwan, James Kelly, the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said, "The US does not support independence for Taiwan or unilateral moves that would change the status quo as we define it."
This statement indicated that only the US has the power to define the status quo and neither Taiwan nor China can do so.
If Taiwan oversteps China's anti-secession law, but the US does not deem that any change in the status quo has taken place, can China take military action against Taiwan? Or, if China cannot engage in full-scale warfare, might it hunt down pro-independence leaders such as Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian?
If China fails to act on its new law, and actually is forced to retreat a position dictated by this law, won't this cause pro-independence activists to push even harder for Taiwan's independence?
China seeks to use the anti-secession law and domestic public opinion as a basis for negotiations with the US, but it has failed to realize that the US' Taiwan Relations Act is simply based on the US ability to project power, but really has nothing to do with its domestic law or domestic public opinion.
If public opinion can really be used as a basis for negotiations with the US, then shouldn't China enact a "unification law" rather than making do with anti-secession legislation?
Taiwan should take this opportunity to explain to Washington that if the law passes, it could jeopardize the status quo in cross-strait relations.
Taiwan has to assure the US of the purpose and scope of Taiwan's constitutional re-engineering and mend the rift.
Taiwan should express its determination to maintain the status quo through negotiations and a willingness to explain to China the scope of its constitutional re-engineering, so that the two nations do not get caught in a vicious cycle of misunderstanding that could lead to war.
Tung Chen-yuan is an associate research fellow at the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University.
TRANSLATED BY DANIEL CHENG
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