When interviewed by the US' Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) on Dec. 10, outgoing US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage sidestepped a question about whether the US will come to Taiwan's defense if China attacks.
He pointed out that "we have the requirement with the Taiwan Relations Act to keep sufficient force in the Pacific to be able to deter attack; we are not required to defend. And these are questions that actually reside with the US Congress, who has to declare an act of war."
Surprisingly, his remarks stirred up a frenzied round of over-interpretation throughout Taiwan. As usual, the Chinese Nationalist Party's (KMT) immediate and incomprehensible reaction to the remarks was to speak for the US and interpret the comments as another warning to President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) government.
Prior to the US presidential election, US Secretary of State Colin Powell mistakenly brought up "peaceful unification" as the solution to the cross-strait dispute in an interview with the media during his visit to Beijing.
A US source familiar with this incident revealed that upon checking the coverage concerning Powell's remark, Armitage made a phone call to Powell. He asked him: "Mr. Powell, do you plan to change the current policy toward China?" Amazed, Powell said, "No, I don't, how come you came up with a question like this?"
Armitage explained that the US policy toward this issue is a "peaceful resolution" rather than "peaceful unification." After this conversation, US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher came forward and reiterated the "peaceful resolution" stance.
After returning to the US, Powell arranged another TV interview and restated the US' policy, replacing "peaceful unification" with "peaceful resolution."
[In other words,] Armitage was aware of the US' long-standing stance and knew that it had no intention of changing its policy. In the interview with PBS, Armitage only aimed to state the consistency of US policy, including the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA, 台灣關係法) and three joint communiques, which serve as the foundation of the US' policy. His statement concerning the US Constitution and the TRA is also a fact based on the rule of law. But even though Armitage is well-versed in the US' China policy, he still made a grave mistake in his statement regarding Taiwan.
The mistake, made during the interview with the PBS, lies in this statement: "But I think we have to manage this question appropriately. We all agree that there is but one China, and Taiwan is part of China."
Obviously, "we" refers to "the US."
He went further, saying that "we are guided in our own relationship with China by three communiques, which have been negotiated by successive administrations, and the Taiwan Relations Act." This proves that his statement was mistaken, because in the three communiques the US only "acknowledges" China's stance that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.
The US, however, never "recognized" or "agreed" with China's stance.
[Starting decades ago,] China, KMT-ruled Taiwan and the US all had different interpretations of the so-called "one China" policy created by the US.?When the US broke off diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 1979 and recognized China, former president Chiang Ching-kuo (
The US should continue to recognize and respect the de jure status and international persona of the ROC." Nonetheless, the US finally recognized the Peoples Republic of China as the only representative of China. Chiang's statement is a clear refusal to accept the idea of "one China" and is a clear statement of a "two country" or "two Chinas" formula.
Armitage did make a grave mistake. Yet Taiwan's former KMT government was even worse, fabricating a national goal to reunify with China under the propaganda of the three principles of the people.
Trapped in a "future China" model,? the KMT dared not voice any objection to the US' "one China" policy for the sake of its political interests, and was unable to resist China's scheme to isolate Taiwan diplomatically.
Currently, China -- taking advantage of its rising political and economic clout -- constantly forces countries, both big and small, to "acknowledge" or "recognize" its stance that Taiwan is part of China.
China's conspicuous intention is to gain the recognition and acknowledgement of every country. In this way it can claim the sovereignty over Taiwan that it has never before possessed on the legal front.
When the KMT, reluctant to implement democracy, was governing Taiwan under an authoritarian rule, it obstinately adhered to the "old sovereign power of China" and the "one China" policy for the sake of its political interests.
While the political scene has become far more liberal since Taiwan underwent democratic reforms, the KMT still lacks the will to shake off its fabricated "one China" shackles and ignores China's ambition to bring Taiwan under its control.
When the US cooked up its "one China" policy, it imposed its opinion on the Taiwanese people. Taiwan has become a more democratic country since the localized Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came to power.
Faced with the "one China" principle, which is endangering the interests of the country, we can no long tolerate it. Even former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), who was also then chairman of the KMT, put forward the "special state-to-state" model to define cross-strait relations. It is now impossible to ask President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) to accept the "one China" policy or overlook the disaster it might incur.
Now that the KMT is not in power, it can afford to be critical of the DPP's efforts to challenge the "one China" policy, pointing out that it may undermine US-Taiwan relations. In fact, faced with a tough choice, choosing not to challenge the "one China" principle would see Taiwan being annexed by China through diplomatic means.
Political friction between Taiwan and the US may occur if the "one China" principle is challenged. To Taiwan, the dispute with the US will incur some "warnings," which are not fatal. If we do not stand firm on challenging the "one China" policy, Taiwan will become another Hong Kong. The US should understand that while it may not have to recognize Taiwan as a country, it cannot force Taiwan to negate itself as a country.
The KMT, gloating over the DPP's troubles, thinks Chen has overstepped the red line drawn by the US. It is an overstatement to say Armitage was warning Taiwan when he said the US is not required to defend Taiwan under the TRA.
First, while Chen has pushed for constitutional reform and to uphold the sovereignty of Taiwan, he has not totally ignored the interests of the US and the security and stability of the region. Otherwise he would not have put forward the "four noes" pledge earlier this year. Second, it is impossible for China to be unaware of the fact that the right to declare an act of war resides with the US Congress and that there is no requirement in the TRA that forces the US to defend Taiwan. Third, no one can precisely say that the US will come to Taiwan's defense if China attacks. However, the leadership of the Chinese government has to presume that the US will be present if China tries to take Taiwan by force.
Armitage was actually answering a hypothetical question. On the Web site of the US State Department, we can see that the excerpt of his interview does not highlight his remarks concerning Taiwan. The PBS interviewer, Charlie Rose, even mistakenly asked whether "we will defend China from Taiwan if they attack?"
Armitage was not authorized to answer "yes" or "no" as the US government has never committed itself to the use of military force. The Sino-US Mutual Defense Treaty, abolished after the US established diplomatic ties with China, only stipulates that actions are to be taken in accordance with constitutional procedures when any signatories (Taiwan and the US) are under military attack. However, it does not stipulate that the US has to send troops to defend Taiwan.
Armitage did not dodge the question by saying, "I can't answer hypothetical questions," nor did he say "yes" or "no." Yet, he admitted that "to make a statement like that is not quite appropriate." He chose to offer a legal explanation, pointing out that the TRA requires the US to provide adequate military equipment for Taiwan to defend itself and keep sufficient force in the Pacific to be able to deter attack, but does not require the US to defend Taiwan.
Armitage's remarks were perfectly clear. The US' strategy is to "deter," using a demonstration of power to warn China not to utilize military force as the first step to "defend Taiwan." To deter, however, does not amount to declaring war. In 1996, China launched missiles toward Taiwan as part of military maneuvers and the US deployed two aircraft carriers to nearby seas.
China immediately stopped its military maneuvers. A situation like that did not require the "US Congress to declare an act of war."
To study the meaning of the TRA, China should include past examples of similar situations. Armitage brought discussions up to the constitutional level when touching on the right to declare a war. The fact is that he would not and could not answer such a sensitive and hypothetical question. He would rather choose an ordinary constitutional procedure to explain how a war would be declared. Considering a remark like this to be a "warning" to Taiwan is sheer overreaction.
James Wang is a journalist based in Washington.
TRANSLATED BY DANIEL CHENG
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