US Secretary of State Colin Powell will depart from his post as soon as National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice is confirmed by the Senate. Rice's job will be taken by her deputy Stephen Hadley. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage has also resigned. It is difficult to speculate how these changes in President George W. Bush's foreign policy team will affect US policy towards Taiwan and China, because there are many uncertainties.
The outcome of US efforts to stabilize Iraq is uncertain. Even if the US were able to eventually extricate itself without leaving chaos behind, it is not clear how long US forces will be embroiled in Iraq. The US preoccupation with the war in Iraq affects its policy towards China and Taiwan.
Iraq and the war against terrorism consume so much of the Bush administration's energy that it is unlikely to devote much attention to the long term effects of its current relations with China and Taiwan.
This means the focus will be on the short term objective of maintaining the status quo. Day-to-day diplomacy would be left to the middle-level officials. The views and attitudes of the new officials may thus wield greater impact on policy direction.
Yet we don't know who will be the new deputy secretary of state and who will manage the State Department's East Asian Bureau.
Powell's remarks in Beijing last month that it is firm US policy not to regard Taiwan as a sovereign nation was never retracted. Despite the State Department's assurance that US policy has not changed and the reiteration of former president Ronald Reagan's Six Assurances, there is lingering concern in Taipei and among observers that Washington may be falling into the trap of Beijing's lien mei chu tai (using the US to subdue Taiwan) strategy, even though Powell was not speaking for the Bush administration when he said inadvertently that the US seeks Taiwan's "reunification" with China.
The term "reunification" is also a misnomer because Taiwan was never a part of the People's Republic of China and Taiwan has been separated from China since 1895, when the Qing dynasty ceded Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan in perpetuity.
In April 2001, Bush said the US would do "whatever it takes" to help defend Taiwan from Chinese attack. He then offered to sell Taiwan a robust arms package.
Since then US-China relations have improved significantly. Since the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the US, Washington has sought Chinese cooperation in the war against terrorism and in arranging the six-party talks with North Korea to resolve the nuclear issue.
With the rapid modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and China's growing ability to project its military power, Washington is compelled to adopt a conciliatory posture towards Beijing. Most of of the US ground forces are stuck in Iraq and the US military is stretched thin. Washington is wary of any conflict elsewhere on the globe.
This is part of the reason for Bush's rebuke of President Chen Shui-bian (
Bush speaks with Chinese President Hu Jintao (
It is not clear how Rice will manage US policy toward Taiwan and China, although the conventional wisdom says that there will be no substantive change.
In contrast to Powell, Rice seems to have a better grasp of the potential threat which a rising China could pose for stability in Asia. In an article in Foreign Affairs (January/February 2000), Rice said China would seek to dominate Asia and is a strategic competitor, that the US must cooperate with Japan and South Korea and maintain a robust military presence in the region.
She also stated while the US "one China" policy is wise, that policy requires both Beijing's renunciation of the use of force and US resolve to resist such force.
In her visit to Beijing in July, Rice firmly upheld the US position against pressure by Beijing's top leaders to stop arms sales to Taiwan.
What is unknown at present is to what extent Rice as secretary of state would commit to the survival of democratic Taiwan against Beijing's growing pressure to accede to its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, in view of Bush's leanings toward China.
As secretary, will Rice be a policymaker or will she simply implement policy made by others?
Despite protestations to the contrary, US policy toward Taiwan has been shifting in China's favor.
Earlier in the Bush administration the policy was "peaceful settlement with the assent of the people of Taiwan." Recently this statement has been changed to "peaceful settlement acceptable to the people in both China and Taiwan."
The latter statement explicitly gives China the right to have a say in Taiwan's future. This is a departure from the nuanced position in the Shanghai communique that the US merely acknowledges China's claim that Taiwan is part of China, without recognizing that claim.
Further erosion in the US Taiwan policy is the seeming inability to distinguish between "non-support of" and "opposition to" Taiwan's independence. Top Bush administration officials take pains to state that US policy is non-support of Taiwan's independence.
However, Beijing officials regularly quote Bush as having stated his "opposition" to Taiwan's independence. The lack of rebuttal to such propaganda adds to the impression that Washington will ultimately deny the 23 million people of Taiwan their yearning to remain free from the oppressive rule of the Chinese Communist Party.
China is steadily building up its capacity to launch a multi-pronged blitzkrieg against Taiwan and to consolidate its conquest quickly before the US can react. China is also building up its Second Artillery's nuclear force against the US homeland and conventional missile strike force against US forces deployed in East Asia.
Taiwan is vulnerable due to its divisive domestic politics. Instead of playing the role of loyal opposition, the pan-blue camp of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and People First Party (PFP) is determined to prevent the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government from effectively governing Taiwan, as though the opposition parties are actually representing Beijing's interests rather than their constituents.
At the same time, the sense of Taiwanese national identity is growing. This gives rise to the rejection of the country's annexation by China and to an increasingly vocal call for a new constitution designed to fit Taiwan's pressing needs to deepen its democracy and to improve the efficiency of governance.
In the legislative election, the pan-green combination of DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union has a good chance of winning a majority in the Legislative Yuan, an outcome which will aggravate Beijing and which may elevate tension in the Taiwan Strait.
In view of the growing likelihood of a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, there are a number of measures the US can adopt. As required by the Taiwan Relations Act, the US needs to enhance its naval and air presence in the Western Pacific, sufficient to discourage China from embarking on military adventures.
The US needs to accelerate research and funding of anti-missile defense against ICBMs with the goal of a joint defense system with Japan which may eventually include Taiwan.
The US must actively press Beijing to respect human rights, move towards political liberalization and renounce the use of force against Taiwan.
Washington could also urge Tokyo and the EU to speak up for peaceful resolution of the dispute between China and Taiwan.
Finally, Washington should allow more direct and higher level contacts with Taipei so matters of mutual concern can be discussed more candidly.
Taiwan's government also needs to exert greater efforts in several areas if a PLA invasion of Taiwan is to be deterred.
First, strengthen national defense, including purchase of the US$18 billion arms package, psychological preparation of the citizenry for a possible PLA attack, and installation of a civil defense system.
Second, revise the policy of actively opening up Taiwan to Chinese visitors and immigrants so as to stem the accelerating infiltration of the country by Chinese spies and special operations personnel.
Third, in promoting economic development, avoid the growing dependence on the Chinese market and reduce the outflow of capital, technology and manpower to China.
Once Taiwan becomes an integral part of China's economy, it may not be possible to retain Taiwan's political independence.
Lastly, while it is useful to promote dialogue with China on bilateral technical issues, Taiwan is not yet ready to negotiate with China on the question of Taiwan's future status. While China has a firm goal of annexing Taiwan, neither Taiwan's government nor the general public has developed a clear consensus and commitment as to what Taiwan's future should be.
It is also disadvantageous to negotiate under the current international situation, where the military balance is decidedly in China's favor and the US is reluctant to offend China. In his 2000 inaugural address, Chen promised that the National Unification Guidelines would not be disturbed. The Guidelines stipulate that China must first evolve into a democracy and its standard of living must become comparable to that of Taiwan before talks about Taiwan's status can commence.
The DPP government should honor its commitment and insist on these two preconditions.
It is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain Taiwan's status quo as a de facto independent, democratic state.
However, it is still possible to build mutual trust with the US and preserve Taiwan's hard-won freedom, provided the Taiwanese government and people are willing to meet the challenge of the hard struggle ahead.
Li Thian-hok is a freelance commentator based in Pennsylvania.
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