Why is it that President Chen Shui-bian's (
I believe that in the current situation, in which no trust exists between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, China has no choice but to react with harsh criticism to Chen's speech to destroy the illusion of accord that he has sought to create. After all, Chen said that his speech was a response to the TAO's May 17 statement [including points on a resumption of cross-strait dialogue, realizing direct links to facilitate exchanges in commerce, trade and transportation, and establishing a mechanism of mutual trust in the military field]. He said that China needs to emphasize the intent of that statement and maintain that the two sides are still at odds, since Taiwan refuses to accept the "one China" principle.
Therefore, the TAO's immediate response and the criticism that has been subsequently aired in the People's Daily do not come as a surprise. But as of now, none of Beijing's statements have been issued by anyone higher than vice-ministerial level, so the critical tone cannot be regarded as being unalterable.
China's policy toward Taiwan has always been dictated from the top. But three days after Chen made his speech, no clear policy had emerged from Beijing. If we are still waiting for a response from the senior leadership, then we don't understand Beijing's policy-making mechanism. The TAO's Oct. 13 response and subsequent articles in the People's Daily all reiterate that "easing tensions is a lie, that Taiwan independence is the truth," but have completely ignored Chen's proposal for direct cargo and passenger links across the Strait.
When questioned by the media about direct links after delivering China's response to Chen's speech, TAO spokesperson Zhang Mingqing (張銘清) said it was a "domestic issue," but this is his own interpretation of the current situation and not an official statement approved by the Beijing government.
With Chen promoting Taiwan sovereignty and "one country on either side" [of the Strait], Beijing surely had no choice but to bring out "domestic issues" to protect itself and avoid creating the impression that it was permitting the three links on Taiwan's terms. But is the "domestic affairs" slogan just a defense posture, or is it one of the key points that China wants Taiwan to accept? It will take some time before this becomes apparent.
In fact, to interpret China's policy, both the status of the official making a statement and the question of which media outlets report on it must be taken into account. Unlike Taiwan's chaotic political environment, China's political system has clear delineations of status and form which can be analyzed. In dealing with cross-strait affairs, the highest authority is the Central Leadership Group for Taiwan Affairs. Therefore, Taiwan shouldn't pay too much attention to the statements issued by China unless they are made by national leaders, the Central Leadership Group or the TAO.
Apart from statements by Beijing officials, we should also pay special attention to the level and format of published criticisms of Taiwan. The highest level of published statement is an editorial by the People's Daily and articles by the commentary teams of either the People's Daily or Xinhua News Agency. Below that are articles posted by either the People's Daily or Xinhua under real names or pseudonyms. Media in Hong Kong or small papers in China represent the lowest level.
So how should we develop cross-strait relations? I believe that the government in Taipei should be aware that speeches by Chen alone are not sufficient, and must be accompanied by substantial gestures of goodwill. Words alone will not only not improve matters, but could easily make them worse. If we do not act with both confidence and patience, how can we achieve peace or development?
Beijing should also understand that repeatedly ignoring opportunities for peace by insisting that all issues brought up by Taiwan impinge on "one China" is not to anybody's advantage. Since former president Jiang Zemin's (
Andy Chang is a professor in the Graduate Institute of China Studies at Tamkang University.
Translated by Ian Bartholomew
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