At the close of the Fourth Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) Central Committee on Sept. 19, Jiang Zemin (
Jiang's resignation is reportedly due to his poor health. He has been suffering from a heart ailment since 1989. Contrary to weeks of speculation prior to the Central Committee assembly, Jiang's protege Vice President Zeng Qinghong (
Despite his retirement, Jiang may retain influence on major foreign policy and national security decisions, especially with regard to Taiwan. Jiang has contributed to the modernization and professionalization of the PLA, managed to sever the PLA from its earlier commercial enterprises and has substantially built up the PLA's capacity to take Taiwan by force. He is responsible for promoting many high-level officers in the PLA. Both the CMC and the Standing Committee of the Politburo have many officials who owe their advancement to Jiang.
China's strategy of annexing Taiwan is not likely to change in the near term as a result of Hu's assumption of full powers. Beijing would want to assess the outcome of the US presidential election in November and Taiwan's Legislative Yuan elections in December. Hu also needs to solidify his relationship with the PLA, just as Jiang did earlier. Hu needs to build his own network of loyal officers across military regions. Here General Xu Caihou would be an invaluable asset to Hu, since Xu played a critical role in all personnel decisions in the PLA, including all senior-level promotions. Once Hu is confident of PLA support, he would be in a position to reappraise and revise China's policy toward Taiwan.
The Jiang-Hu power struggle was basically about the division of the spoils: which side gets a greater share of powerful positions and who gets control over coveted financial resources. There were also differences on domestic policy. Whereas Jiang stressed rapid economic development centered on the coastal provinces and especially around Shanghai, Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao (
However, what unites both camps is far more important than what divides them. Both camps agree on the major directions China needs to follow.
First, continue the market-oriented rapid economic development, to create a wealthy nation with a powerful military. Second, pursue an expansionist geostrategic goal of first annexing Taiwan, then scuttling the US-Japan military alliance and eventually turning Japan and the Koreas into China's vassal states. The CCP, the PLA and the Chinese public are all driven by an ingrained sense of aggrieved nationalism and believe China is destined to become not just the hegemon of Asia but also a great civilization, rivaling the US in power and prestige.
Third, to achieve the above ends, the CCP must continue to monopolize political power and reject Western notions of democracy. The theme of the Central Committee plenum, in fact, was how to enhance the CCP's ability to rule an increasingly restless Chinese society. So what will be the likely impact of Hu's ascendancy on China's strategy of absorbing Taiwan?
Jiang followed a rigid hardline stance, humiliating Taiwan at every opportunity. Despite his outward appearance, Hu is just as tough -- witness his merciless suppression of dissidents while he was governor of Tibet. Hu would not hesitate to invade Taiwan if he concludes the PLA can coerce Taiwan into submission quickly before the US can intervene. US forces will be bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan for some time to come. This period could present China with an ideal window of opportunity to launch a surprise attack against Taiwan.
However, the Hu-Wen team may be able to adopt a carrot and stick approach to Taiwan, once Hu manages to command the respect of the PLA. For example, Beijing is keenly interested in implementing the three direct links in mail, transport and trade between China and Taiwan. The direct links will deepen Taiwan's economic dependence on China and help marginalize Taiwan's economy. Direct links will also open Taiwan's door further to infiltration by China's intelligence agents and special forces operatives. China's Trojan Horse will thus be well-positioned to launch subversive activities and an assault on Taiwan's political leadership, military facilities and key infrastructure in conjunction with an all-out multi-pronged blitzkrieg against Taiwan.
Until now China has insisted that any dialogue between Taiwan be preconditioned on Taiwan's acceptance of the "one China" principle, which sees Taiwan as part of China's territory. A more confident Hu regime will be able to adopt a flexible approach to entice Taipei into the direct links trap. In fact, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council issued an official document last December emphasizing that the "three direct links" is purely an economic matter and political differences between the two sides should not be used as a pretext for obstructing its implementation. It suggested that non-governmental trade organizations conduct negotiations.
If Beijing finds a way to avoid labeling the direct links as an internal affair of China, it is possible the Taiwan government may actually pursue the direct links with China, under pressure from businesspeople heavily invested in China, the pan-blue opposition parties and the pro-unification media. Implementation of the direct links would, unfortunately, sound the death knell for a democratic Taiwan which is independent of China's political control.
In conclusion, the Hu-Wen government will pose a greater threat to Taiwan's freedom, because while continuing to build up its capacity to overwhelm Taiwan by force, it will also present a smiling face, make inconsequential goodwill gestures to Taiwan (such as allowing Taiwan to gain observer status in the WHO) and fool the Taiwanese into committing suicidal acts.
On Sept. 20, while meeting model military personnel at the Presidential Office, President Chen Shui-bian (
Li Thian-hok is a freelance commentator based in Pennsylvania.
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