Xinhua reports that the 4th plenary session of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) 16th Central Committee will be held in Beijing from Sept. 16 to 19. A recent report in The New York Times claimed that Jiang Zemin (
Jiang's term as commission chairman is about to expire. If he really is contemplating such a move, it is probably a clever strategy aimed at gaining an advantage by retreating -- he will take one step back to be able to take two steps forward. By relinquishing power he would in fact be ensuring a place in history for himself and his "three represents" -- the party must represent the foremost productivity, the most advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the masses -- thereby consolidating the power of the Shanghai Clique. A meeting presided over by Hu on Sept. 7 also reiterated Jiang's "three represents."
`Three represents'
Following the meeting, a CCP announcement of a party politburo meeting to discuss the documents to be reviewed at the plenary session affirmed that former leader Deng Xiaoping's (
In addition, Jiang could use his resignation as a bargaining chip in his dealings with Hu, making their struggle over military power even more obvious. The New York Times' report showed that opinions within the military leadership are divided on the question of whether Jiang should resign.
Among the three commission deputy chairmen, Hu has still not made his position clear, although most outsiders think he wants Jiang to retire, since that would be the only way for Hu to concentrate party, government and military power in his own hands. Only by controling all government power will Hu be able to promote his own opinions.
Who will replace Hu?
The report stated that Cao Gangchuan (
But the third deputy chairman, Guo Boxiong (
Rumor has it that Jiang wants Vice President Zeng Qinghong (
Hu does not want to appear weak. He plans to promote the Chief of the General Staff Liang Guanglie (
Military and politics
This conflict represents part of the the power struggle between Jiang and Hu, and it also shows that power over the military remains crucial to consolidating and guaranteeing political power in China, where intense struggles are only too easy to imagine.
If Hu becomes the highest government, party and military leader, not only in name, but also in fact, the question is whether that would lead to any adjustments in China's economic and trade policies and Taiwan strategy. Chinese analysts stress that the division among leaders is making bureaucrats unwilling to compromise on issues related to sovereignty and security to avoid being blamed for harming core national interests.
I agree with this point of view, because solving the Taiwan problem is the highest responsibility for every Chinese leader, and it concerns matters of fundamental national importance and the historic status of individual leaders.
Because of this, everyone is afraid of lightly making any "historical decisions," and they are also afraid of putting their own position at risk by sincerely and honestly considering how to resolve the complex dispute surrounding the Taiwan issue. The only subject being considered at present is finding temporary relief in the dynamic cross-strait relationship in order to manipulate vested interests.
It is easy to see that it is precisely the complex and ever-changing nature of this relationship that makes Jiang want to use it as leverage, but apart from causing domestic unease in China, the internal power struggle also indirectly makes a solution to the Taiwan issue both urgent and necessary.
We believe that if Jiang retires, Hu can look forward to forging a new inter-party consensus on the Hong Kong and Taiwan issues. However, Chinese scholars stress that there are no signs that Hu is about to make any significant changes when it comes to these two issues.
The Hong Kong and Taiwan issues are complex and everchanging: they are not purely a matter of Chinese domestic affairs, they involve the intervention of international forces and cannot be directly solved simply by Hu's accession to total power. Does that mean that they must be resolved by changes to attitudes, wisdom and the overall framework? It will be difficult to accomplish such a task in the short term. The final problem in the cross-strait relationship will probably be separating and resolving [Chinese] nationalism and Taiwan consciousness.
Li Hua-chiu is a part-time researcher with the National Policy Foundation.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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