The "balance of powers" and media freedom have long been a bottleneck in the process of China's political reform. The "centralist" party culture bequeathed by Mao Zedong (
In addition, reform since 1989 has been hampered by hesitancy in dealing with these problems. For this reason, China's media law has been discussed for the last 20 years but has always ended up as one of the first victims of any political struggle. But now there is a slim chance that things may change.
In the transfer of power that should have been effected by the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Central Military Commission Chairman Jiang Zemin (江澤民), who was supposedly retiring, retained control of the military, creating two centers of power. On the one side is Jiang, who tries to emulate Deng in exercising influence through his control of the military, even while claiming to be nothing more than an ordinary party member. On the other side are the new leaders who have recently taken office and are also following Deng's example in seeking to force Jiang to release his hold on the military and retire -- both in name and in fact.
But Deng's experience was unique to himself and the power that he wielded at the end of his career is not something that Jiang can easily acquire. In addition, there are the lessons of the Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen Square Massacre, which have made party members more sensitive to Jiang's ambitions to become a "supreme emperor."
All this has meant that there is an unprecedented degree of equality between the two power centers, with the new leaders representing the mainstream. This balance of power within the political structure is rarely seen, but it will probably persist for some time. The situation is likely to remain stable until there is a change in the senior leadership, so it will probably remain until one of the two power centers disappears.
Although the existence of these two centers of power might be a fluke, it has created something akin to a separation of powers. Although both sides are constantly making moves to attack each other, they are also unwilling to give their opponent any advantage and are therefore extremely careful to avoid political mistakes. They can not afford to be arrogant and domineering.
At the moment both sides are mapping out strategy while keeping an eye on the adversary, waiting for the other side to make a misstep that they can take advantage of. They keep their comments to a minimum on most sensitive issues, watching their adversary perform, putting them to the test.
The case of Dr. Jiang Yanyong (
Premier Wen Jiabao's (溫家寶) macroeconomic reforms have come under attack from Jiang and his Shanghai clique and President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) had to personally visit Shanghai to smooth things over. When Hong Kong's Wen Wei Po reported that the Central Military Commission meeting had proposed an invasion of Taiwan prior to 2020, this was interpreted as an attempt by Jiang to retain a hold on power until that time, a suggestion that infuriated Hu.
When Hu and Wen used the 100th anniversary of Deng's birth to force Jiang to retire, it was widely discussed in party publications. The prominent characteristic of these struggles between Hu and Wen and their adversary Jiang is the diligent avoidance of direct confrontation.
The debate has generally been conducted through a third party, so that there is always room for an about-face if necessary. This high-level maneuvering has provided the private sector with more creative space to comment, and people such as Jiang Yanyong, Jiao Guobiao (
Although this is a far cry from possessing a free press, in comparison to the level of ideological control once exercised by the government, it is a very significant breakthrough.
But this balance of powers is an abnormal situation. It creates a high level of risk, as we saw from the incarceration of Jiang Yanyong. Traditional Chinese political culture has never allowed for "one mountain to have two tigers," so it is only a matter of time and opportunity before one side or the other shows their hand.
When victory has been decided, the winner will become the paramount power within the government, and those who have used the limited freedom of expression that has been achieved will be prosecuted and removed from their official positions. Their leaders are likely to lose their voice altogether if they don't accept amnesty in return for acceding to the official line. At this point China will enter a new cycle of authoritarianism.
This situation gives rise to an appealing fantasy -- as there is now a de facto balance of power, could this situation not be institutionalized and maintained? Maybe there will be a realization of the myth that democratization will happen first within the party. Or for that matter, the political section of the party might simply act independently.
Basically, the current bifurcation of China's political establishment should be used as a means of pushing through the bottleneck in reform, breaking away from the cycle of dictatorial government and shifting from a paradigm of "if I live, you must die" to peaceful coexistence and mutual restraint. If this were to happen, then the CCP could become a modern political party and China could be set on the road toward becoming a constitutional democracy that would be part of modern civilization.
If this were the case, the existence of two centers of power, or even multiple centers of power, would provide opportunities for political development. But this is just the view of an academic, and it remains to be seen whether our wise politicians are able to take advantage of this opportunity. On this score, Taiwan's development of constitutional democracy over recent years can provide valuable lessons for China's leaders.
Zhang Weiguo is a freelance writer.
Translated by Ian Bartholomew
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