Taiwan is being urged by the US to become more assertive if it wants to procure AEGIS-equipped destroyers.
"Taiwan needs to communicate a renewed interest in the platform with a new aggressive campaign -- a firm letter of request [LOR] or other formal means of communication could be helpful. If not, the AEGIS question will be moot," stated a US defense source close to the project.
Taiwan's political leadership and military staff officers, as well as many officials in the US government, are currently passive about the AEGIS issue. Taiwan must engage the US government before running out of time, the source said.
The source cited three reasons why Taiwan must move forward with the sale.
First, if US President George W. Bush loses the election in November, a Democratic administration is unlikely to release AEGIS destroyers.
Second, as the recently released US Department of Defense (DoD) report to Congress on Chinese military capabilities notes, there is a growing threat to Taiwan as Beijing increases the numbers of advanced naval platforms, air-combat aircraft and tactical ballistic missiles.
Third, in 2006 there could be a gap in production, as US shipyards will begin retooling for the next series of modern destroyers, possibly resulting in large-scale lay offs.
According to a Northrop Grumman source, "Our workload forecasting and PERT [Program Evaluation Review Technique] charts show that we will be wrapping up our last contracted DDG-51 for the US Navy at the end of 2006 or early 2007. Once that is done, we will shut down the assembly line. If anyone wants to purchase the DDG-51/AEGIS after we shut down the assembly and lay off the highly trained and skilled DDG-51 craftsmen and technicians, you can imagine the added costs involved. So, if anyone intends to buy this system, they should wisely sign up soon."
The US has been holding off on a final decision until Taiwan determines its own requirements. Taiwan's navy submitted an LOR for price and availability (P&A) data in the summer of 2002, but there was no response from the US, due to concern over Taiwan's domestic squabbling over Kidd-class destroyers.
"There was some concern Taiwan would not go forward with the Kidd sale, which the US considered necessary as interim platform for the AEGIS," stated the defense source. "If the US had approved the AEGIS sale during the Kidd debate, the Taiwanese likely would have canceled the acquisition of Kidd-class destroyers."
Now that the Kidd issue has been resolved and delivery is expected next year, the source said that the "likelihood of approval is high" for the AEGIS program, but "Taiwan has been suffering from paralysis due to political infighting."
However, the source cautioned there would be some opposition in the US. First, some officials in the State Department and within the National Security Council staff "fear crossing China's `red line,' or its threshold for tolerance," but according to the source, "this assertion is ridiculous in light of China's unprecedented military build-up."
Second, there are fears that Taiwan will have trouble affording the platforms. There are difficulties with the current attempt to acquire eight diesel-powered submarines, which, if the program falters, could lead to reallocation of the budget for AEGIS. US officials have privately suggested that Taiwan examine cheaper options, such as refurbished submarines, which could be as much as 20 percent of the cost currently estimated for eight new submarines. The intent is to free up funds for more pressing requirements, such as C4ISR upgrades, missile defense and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) surveillance equipment.
Third, there are also concerns over technology transfer. Some people in Washington have voiced concerns over AEGIS technology falling into the hands of China. One local defense observer said "this notion is false," due to tight US technology transfer controls and technology safeguards that reduce risks.
"Much of the technology is now COTS [commercial off-the-shelf] and not that high-tech," stated the source. Also, China already has much of the technology from domestic research and development of its own "Chinese AEGIS" platform.
A defense source closely affiliated with naval programs emphasized that AEGIS destroyers are important for Taiwan's defense, and should be considered a priority acquisition. First, AEGIS could be a centerpiece of Taiwan's C4ISR modernization program. The platforms could serve as an alternate national air defense center, augmenting the Regional Operations Control Center program, and could also serve as an ASW operations center.
Third, the platform could support a missile defense capability if equipped with the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3). Taiwan must have a mid-course intercept capability to counter longer-range missiles, such as China's precision-guided DF-21C (CSS-5) medium range ballistic missile, which has a range of 1,800km and a re-entry speed that precludes interception by PAC-3 (Patriot) missiles.
However, the SM-3 can intercept missiles in the mid-course phase of flight. It also can engage missiles before they initiate technical countermeasures, which China is developing for the DF-11 (CSS-7) and DF-15 (CSS-6).
As a terminal defense system, the PAC-3 generally is capable of engaging ballistic missiles with a maximum range of approximately 1000km. However, China is developing countermeasures against PAC-3s on some of their short-range ballistic missiles by developing early release submunitions and maneuverable re-entry vehicles. AEGIS destroyers equipped with the SM-3, which can intercept these missiles before the countermeasures are initiated, could mitigate these problems. The SM-3 has already been approved for Japan and Australia for introduction next year.
Taiwan's AEGIS problems go back many years. The Advanced Combat System (ACS) was centered on the AEGIS combat system and was approved in 1992 for PFG-2 Perry-class frigates. However, for financial and technical reasons, Taiwan's navy canceled the ACS program.
People First Party Legislator Nelson Ku (
"Back in 1992 we got permission from the US to get a mini-AEGIS [or ACS] system for the Perry-class [frigates], but finally, because of budget constraints, we could not even afford a mini-AEGIS. The AEGIS system is quite expensive. Today we cannot afford four AEGIS warships," he said.
In addition, there was the controversial arms sales decision in 2001 when Taiwan was offered Kidd-class destroyers as an interim platform for the AEGIS. Three assessments by the DoD validated Taiwan's requirement for AEGIS destroyers: the February 2000 ASW assessment, an August 2000 Naval Modernization Study, and then a September 2000 assessment on Taiwan's ability to maintain and operate AEGIS destroyers. The US DoD also certified Taiwan's ability to operate and maintain the platform, the need for a land-based trainer and the Kidds as an interim step.
Based on the conclusions of these studies, the US government is said to have issued a "soft approval" in April 2001 for AEGIS. It privately communicated to Taiwan's officials that a study could be conducted jointly by the US and Taiwan on specific requirements, such as platform configuration, assuming Taiwan would fund the study. It was implied that the study would lead to production and sale of AEGIS destroyers to Taiwan.
Initially, Taiwan supported the idea of a study, but then turned down the offer. However, the US went forward with the study without Taiwan's assistance. The study identified the specific configuration, but the US was hesitant to move too aggressively until the Kidd issue was resolved in the Legislative Yuan.
After the Kidd issue was finalized in the summer of last year, the US Navy concluded that it was in favor of moving ahead, but Taiwan had become passive on the issue. One local defense source in Taiwan said the problem was in part due to "bureaucratic saturation" within the ROC Navy staff, which is having a difficult time managing the full array of navy programs, such as submarines and the P-3C maritime patrol aircraft.
In addition, despite its stress on missile defense, the Democratic Progressive Party leadership has not aggressively pursued the upper tier capability that Taiwan so desperately needs to counter the growing PRC conventional ballistic missile threat. With the production gap in the US' Bath and Ingalls shipyards in 2006, in which the yards will be retooling for new ships to replace the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, some US officials are urging Taiwan to take the initiative.
If Taiwan can rid itself of political infighting and time-consuming debate, it might be able to muster up enough of a defense to stall China's advances well into the next decade.
However, if Taiwan falters and allows internecine politics to continue, China could easily conquer Taiwan within the next 10 years.
Wendell Minnick is the Jane's Defence Weekly correspondent for Taiwan.
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