The Chinese government released a statement on the Taiwan issue after midnight on May 16. Since the statement was authorized by the government, and was issued so close to President Chen Shui-bian's (
The speech shows the carrot and the stick approach, as it included hardline principles and threats as well as flexible and pragmatic suggestions. It was not necessarily "an unprecedented severe threat to Taiwan," as the opposition camp claimed.
The statement repeatedly attacked Chen's "five noes" principle accusing him of lacking honesty and credibility, firmly insisting on the "one China" principle while refusing to tolerate Taiwan's independence. From this perspective, whether Chen would mention the "five noes" again in his speech was not a concern to Beijing anymore. Nevertheless, the statement did not mention the "one country, two systems" policy either. Although it insisted on the "one China" principle, it did not specify the concrete content of this principle. This time, Beijing's conditions for cross-strait development were not based on Taipei's acceptance of the "one China" principle. Instead, the statement simplified Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen's (
Among the seven suggestions in the statement, the first suggestion vacuously but positively responded to Chen's call for building a "peace and stability framework." Apart from the old issue of the opening of cross-strait links, Beijing also added the negotiation of Taiwan's international survival space and closer economic cooperation on the basis of reciprocity.
The seven suggestions were not necessarily all good for Taiwan. Still, changes such as preliminary recognition of Chen's "peace and stability framework" and the mention of Taiwan's need for international space had positive meanings. This shows that US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly's statements that the US "continues to urge Beijing and Taipei to pursue dialogue as soon as possible through any available channels" and "the US continues to be a strong supporter of Taiwan's participation in international organizations" affected the attitudes of Chinese President Hu Jintao (
The statement was the most important message since the new leadership took control of Taiwan affairs in January, and its content varied from Jiang's eight points. The attacks on Chen's honesty and credibility, as well as the insistence on the "one China" principle, satisfied the demands of the hawks. On the other hand, the changes demonstrated the pragmatic components of China's thinking on Taiwan, showing that Hu and Wen have noted that "Taiwan recognition" has become a mainstream value, and that it's necessary to deal with the issue pragmatically. The statement was also a positive response to Kelly's words. The statement shows that although Beijing is not too optimistic about the cross-strait issue, the situation is not hopeless.
Lai I-chung directs foreign policy studies at the Taiwan Thinktank.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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