It must be hard for Beijing to live with another four years of President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). China's politics vis-a-vis Taiwan have been personality-oriented. When Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) was president, he took all the personal abuse and vilification for advocating Taiwan's sovereignty. It has been Chen's turn in the past four years.
There is obviously a purpose in personalizing such vilification. In this way, Chen becomes the villain and at odds with the people of Taiwan, who supposedly long for unification with the mainland. China's failure in regard to Taiwan is thus simplified by focusing on personalities rather than policies, notwithstanding the fact that Chen won 50 percent of the vote. And it also helps to mobilize the people in China in a supposedly national cause jointly desired by the people across the Taiwan Strait.
By simultaneously maintaining military pressure, the Taiwanese are urged to get rid of their of-fending and traitorous president or else suffer the consequences. It is true that, unlike the past two presidential elections in 1996 and 2000, this time the military threat was less explicit. But the missile buildup targeting Taiwan makes the military threat an ongoing consideration.
Which brings us to Taiwan's security situation. That is: how will Taiwan cope with this nightmare? The country remains in a virtual state of siege, further reinforced by Beijing's moves to prevent Taiwan from projecting an international personality through diplomatic ties. China hopes that the resultant claustrophobia will turn the people of Taiwan against its leaders who champion a distinct Taiwanese identity.
The problem is that this hasn't worked so far. Taiwan has been under virtual siege, both psychologically and militarily, for a long time. Despite this, Chen was still able to poll 50.1 percent of the vote, an increase of about 11 percent. In other words, China's heavy-handed approach is simply proving counterproductive. The way Beijing is riding roughshod over the "one country, two systems" principle in Hong Kong is bound to further rally people against China.
What then are China's options? Beijing seems commit-ted to bringing about Taiwan's "unification" by force, if necessary. It has warned that Chen's planned constitutional referendum and its enactment will not be tolerated.
Premier Wen Jiabao (
But there is ambiguity in the Chinese position. For instance, the adoption of a new constitution doesn't by itself make Taiwan formally independent. Indeed, Beijing had even regarded the presidential elections in 1996 and 2000 as moves toward independence. And its fury and military threats to stop the process were to no avail. The direct presidential elections are a part of Taiwan's democratic process -- and China has to lump it.
Therefore, going by past experience, one could hazard the guess that as long as there is no formal declaration of Tai-wan's independence, China would do all the threatening (including deployment of more missiles) without actually invading the island. Of course, this is subject to a clear American resolve to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. And to this end, Beijing would now and then test US commitment by upping the ante, say at the time of the planned constitutional referendum in 2006.
So far the US commitment is quite solid, subject to the essential maintenance of the status quo. President George W. Bush has said, "We oppose any unilateral decision, by either China or Taiwan, to change the status quo." But the visiting Wen was also reportedly told last December "in no uncertain terms that we, the United States, would have to get involved if China tried to use coercion or force to unilaterally change the status of Taiwan." The US commitment now apparently extends even to coercive measures by China.
How the US will interpret Chen's referendum exercise in the face of Chinese threats will depend on a host of factors, including the Iraq situation, the "war on terrorism" and North Korean nuclear proliferation. In other words, it depends on how overstretched America will be militarily and China's consequent leverage.
The People's Liberation Army newspaper has bluntly said: "The United States should not expect that China would still engage in all-round cooperation with it even if it connives at and gives tacit permission to the separatist activities carried out by a locality of China."
It is clear, though, that the US will not allow China to attack and annex Taiwan. China's global strategy militates against the emergence of any power that might challenge its dominance. A forcible takeover of Taiwan by China will strongly undermine US supremacy.
Taiwan is very vulnerable without a US security guarantee. Any amount of weaponry it might buy from the US will not significantly alter this situation. It might buy some time until the US military comes to its rescue. But knowing that the US is committed to Taiwan will be an overriding deterrent for China.
A military invasion of Taiwan will have to be a huge affair involving almost all elements of the Chinese armed forces. It will not only involve attacking the country but also securing it after a successful invasion, a tall task considering China's relative military backwardness. At the same time, China's invading force will be exposed to constant enemy action.
It is a big risk for China to take for an essentially political objective. China is therefore likely to continue its efforts to weaken Taiwan from within with military threats, psychological pressure, economic allurements and punishments, and by fostering political divisions.
In any case, as Chen has said, "we have no intention of changing the status quo" but instead seek to "defend Taiwan's independent status quo and ensure that it cannot be changed."
Sushil Seth is a freelance writer based in Sydney.
As strategic tensions escalate across the vast Indo-Pacific region, Taiwan has emerged as more than a potential flashpoint. It is the fulcrum upon which the credibility of the evolving American-led strategy of integrated deterrence now rests. How the US and regional powers like Japan respond to Taiwan’s defense, and how credible the deterrent against Chinese aggression proves to be, will profoundly shape the Indo-Pacific security architecture for years to come. A successful defense of Taiwan through strengthened deterrence in the Indo-Pacific would enhance the credibility of the US-led alliance system and underpin America’s global preeminence, while a failure of integrated deterrence would
The Executive Yuan recently revised a page of its Web site on ethnic groups in Taiwan, replacing the term “Han” (漢族) with “the rest of the population.” The page, which was updated on March 24, describes the composition of Taiwan’s registered households as indigenous (2.5 percent), foreign origin (1.2 percent) and the rest of the population (96.2 percent). The change was picked up by a social media user and amplified by local media, sparking heated discussion over the weekend. The pan-blue and pro-China camp called it a politically motivated desinicization attempt to obscure the Han Chinese ethnicity of most Taiwanese.
On Wednesday last week, the Rossiyskaya Gazeta published an article by Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) asserting the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) territorial claim over Taiwan effective 1945, predicated upon instruments such as the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation. The article further contended that this de jure and de facto status was subsequently reaffirmed by UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 1971. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs promptly issued a statement categorically repudiating these assertions. In addition to the reasons put forward by the ministry, I believe that China’s assertions are open to questions in international
The Legislative Yuan passed an amendment on Friday last week to add four national holidays and make Workers’ Day a national holiday for all sectors — a move referred to as “four plus one.” The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), who used their combined legislative majority to push the bill through its third reading, claim the holidays were chosen based on their inherent significance and social relevance. However, in passing the amendment, they have stuck to the traditional mindset of taking a holiday just for the sake of it, failing to make good use of
RSS