Presidential Office Secretary-General Chiou I-jen (邱義仁) has been dispatched to Washington for wide-ranging discussions. The topics of these talks are expected to include the contents of President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) inauguration speech and Taiwan and US foreign policy in general, as well as seeking a future framework for the bilateral relationship, which went through a difficult period during the presidential campaign.
The US has already sent a clear post-election message through Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia James Kelly. It does not want to see any changes in the cross-strait status quo, and any change in that status quo must be achieved peacefully. The "status quo," as defined by the US, means that Beijing must not use military force against Taiwan, that Taipei must be cautious in its handling of cross-strait issues and that neither side may issue statements or take actions that unilaterally change Taiwan's status.
There are reasons for the US concerns. Beijing stresses its sincerity in resolving the Taiwan issue peacefully, yet it also increases its deployment of missiles aimed at Taiwan and raises its preparedness for a military attack. Taiwan issues repeated guarantees that there is no schedule for independence, but it has held a referendum on this issue and plans to write a new constitution to reaffirm itself as independent and sovereign. These actions have made Beijing firmly believe that Taiwan is moving toward independence, and that is a situation the US is not happy about.
However, the status quo is not a static situation but a dynamic and interactive process. While Chen announced last year that there were 496 missiles aimed at Taiwan, the number may now have reached 550. This situation deepens Taiwan's sense of crisis and its fears that the status quo may be changed by Chinese violence. US arms sales to Taiwan must therefore be strengthened to maintain national security.
Regarding Taiwan's planned 2006 referendum on constitutional reform, Kelly bluntly said "there are limitations with respect to what the United States will support." He also said "We do no one any favors if we are unclear in our expectations or obfuscate where those limitations are. The president's policy regarding our opposition to unilateral changes to the status quo will be reinforced in this dialogue with Taiwan about its political evolution."
Taiwan's constitutional reforms aim to remake the legislature, downsize the government and streamline the bureaucracy. These efforts are undertaken to deepen democracy, and do not involve any changes to the status quo. The surge in Taiwanese identity was played a critical role in Chen's electoral victory. This is a mainstream trend, but judging from post-election social divisions, there's no social consensus regarding a change of national flag and title.
After his re-election, Chen proposed establishing a "cross-strait peace development commission" and guidelines for peaceful development across the Taiwan Strait. He also said he's willing to open direct links and to appoint a representative to Beijing to smooth communication and reduce tensions.
Taiwan has thus taken the initiative to show its good will. This could be seen as an effort to change the status quo, but such change should be welcomed by Taiwan and the international community.
On Monday, China's National People's Congress vetoed Hong Kong residents' right to directly elect their chief executive. This vote leaves Beijing's "one country, two systems" policy on the fringe of bankruptcy, and is unacceptable to Hong Kongers, not to mention to much more democratic Taiwan.
The ball is now in China's court. The region's future depends on how Beijing will view these opportunities for cross-strait interaction offered by the March 20 election.
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