One answer to the question of why black South Africans voted in such large numbers for the African National Congress (ANC) in last week's elections is that there was nothing else for which they could vote.
Most of the other parties are connected in the minds of black voters with the old days of white rule, or are regional parties or minor ANC rivals or allies. No conceivable shift of allegiance could bring them to power, so there was no choice of that kind. The real choice is whether or not to support the project with which the ANC is identified, that of upholding the dignity and transforming the prospects of the country's black majority.
It is hardly surprising that in spite of their disappointments over the last decade, ordinary people were ready to endorse this continuation by other means of the liberation for which the ANC fought under apartheid. The turnout, high by Western standards, was less than in the last election, testifying to some citizens expressing by abstention their disapproval or disillusion.
But the ANC may still achieve the two-thirds majority that will enable it to change the constitution if it wishes, and President Thabo Mbeki, although not much loved, will go on to another term, able to point to solid popular approval.
South Africa has had a dominant party for more than half a century. The National Party ruled from 1948 to 1994, never seriously threatened by those opponents it permitted, and acted at times as if it and the state were interchangeable. It too was engaged in a project of national liberation, aiming at strengthening an Afrikaner society that had been oppressed by the British.
Nelson Mandela was ready to recognize Afrikaners as a people struggling against British colonialism. Another and larger liberation of course overtook them, and after much stupidity and cruelty and, to be fair, much heart-searching as well, Afrikaners ceded power.
The next wave crashed on the shore. But although this liberation concerns a majority and not a minority, it shares some of the problems of its predecessor.
As a political system with a dominant party, South Africa is not a one-party state or a dictatorship; it does not rig its elections and it is not lawless. But how can such a democracy function if there is no alternation in power?
How can efficiency be achieved if affirmative action brings into public service and business echelons of people who might otherwise not have risen to those positions, setting off a cycle of patronage which cannot then be easily stopped? How can these leaders adequately provide jobs, housing and education for ordinary folk? How can the need to satisfy the demands of local and international businesses be reconciled with the need to satisfy the demands of ordinary people for rapid improvement in their circumstances? And how to bridge the gap between rhetoric and reach, between the proclamation of policy and its execution?
Difficulties of this kind are not confined to South Africa, but occur with variations in a number of developing societies where a dominant party has emerged, for whatever reasons.
In The Awkward Embrace, an enlightening collection of essays edited by South African scholars Hermann Giliomee and Charles Simkins, they suggest that "a corrupt business-state relationship" may well be the worst danger in this situation. In Mexico, Malaysia, Taiwan and South Africa -- the countries their book is mainly concerned with -- business, government and a state-dependent middle class form, or formed, a constellation unfavorable to democracy. South Africa's big-business sector, they write rather bitterly, "is with a few exceptions guided almost completely by short-term calculations. As in the days of apartheid, it is quite comfortable with one-party domination, and ... many of the conglomerates are more interested to curry favour with the dominant party in order to obtain state contracts or concessions."
The dependence of the middle class, including privileged groups of unionized labour, on the state-business alliance is particularly critical, since the very social level that is usually active in democratic pluralism is thus co-opted. That has been clear in Malaysia, for example, especially for the Malays, because of the Bumiputra program. In South Africa the growing black middle class is equally indebted to the party for what it has already received and what it may receive in the future.
The greatest difficulty for dominant parties is that they must play to two constituencies -- one to the right, consisting of business and the new class of beneficiaries they and business together have created, and one to the left, consisting of the masses they also are trying to serve and whose interests in theory are their priority. The South African picture of unemployed men and women queueing in the sun to vote in the shadow of skyscraper offices on whose executive floors black South Africans are more and more a presence sums up these contradictions.
The internal democracy of the dominant party can substitute to some extent for the competition and choice of a multiparty system. But it is an imperfect substitute, even where the party has a record of strong internal debate.
One former ANC minister, interviewed on condition of anonymity not that long after his party took power, lamented: "In the old days we came out of meetings, even if we had lost the argument, feeling that we owned the decision that had been made." His implication was that now decisions came either from on high or emerged out of factional machinations.
While dominant parties may observe democratic rules, their main contribution to democracy comes when they lose their dominance. This has happened in Taiwan and Mexico, has emphatically not happened in Malaysia or Singapore, and is a long way off in South Africa.
Mbeki argued at the party's 1995 conference that the ANC could only dissolve after white racial dominance had been entirely overturned. Only then could the ANC give birth to the two or more parties that potentially exist within it.
Dominant parties generally come apart because they fail to live up to the inclusiveness that is their main claim to legitimacy. Sometimes dominant parties whose moment has passed deliberately organize an end to their dominance, as in a way the National Party did.
The ANC is surely a force for good in a way the National Party never was, but wisdom lies in the recognition that there will come a time, and there should come a time, when its dominance will have passed into history.
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