The results of the March 20 presidential election have not only reshaped Taiwan's domestic politics but have also created a window of opportunity for China's leaders to readjust their strategy toward President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) administration.
Noting that international concerns center on whether or not Chen's victory will have an instant effect on the stalemated cross-strait situation, Chen provided an immediate answer to the world community by saying that his re-election would result in a continued effort by his administration to pursue peaceful interactions with Beijing.
In addition to reiterating that his plan to change the Constitution in 2006 will have no bearing on the cross-strait status quo, Chen called for the US to play a constructive role as mediator and urge Beijing to restart talks with Taipei.
Beijing played down Chen's victory and took advantage of the post-election political turmoil in Taipei to claim that there might be a need for Beijing to "step in." Beijing also poured cold water on Chen's victory by stealing one of Taiwan's diplomatic allies, Dominica. Beijing's initial reaction displayed no respect for the democratically elected Chen.
The question is: Can Beijing maintain for another four years its policy of having no contact with the Chen administration?
China must at least recognize two factors when it comes to the question of how to deal with Chen.
The first factor is the rise of Taiwanese consciousness.
The fact that Chen was able to increase his voter support from 39.3 percent in 2000 to 50.1 percent this year -- and that he increased his vote total by nearly 1.5 million votes -- should not be overlooked by Beijing. Most people tend to attribute the growth of Chen's support to the rise of Taiwanese consciousness.
With a new mandate and over 7 million referendum votes cast in support of peaceful interaction with Beijing, Chen ac-quired enough legitimacy to generate domestic consensus on cross-strait policy. Under these circumstances, Beijing will have no choice but to face political reality and open the door to Chen.
The new generation of Chinese leadership, led by technocrats such as President Hu Jintao (
The second factor that Beijing must keep in mind involves the extent to which events in Hong Kong could generate pressure on the Chinese leadership. The experiment of the "one country, two systems" approach in Hong Kong has produced nothing but added restrictions on Hong Kongers' political freedom. In addition, Hong Kong's economy has deteriorated.
Beijing's recent attempts to dictate policy on political reforms in Hong Kong -- which include a proposal to directly elect the head of the territory by 2007 -- have widely been perceived as a "preventive means" of countering Taiwan's democratic progress. The question is: Can the emerging democratic forces in the territory be oppressed forever?
The cross-strait relationship has entered a new phase that will entail searching for common ground. China's strategy of siding with Taiwan's opposition and undermining Chen's power in the past four years has proved to be a total failure. China must adjust its approach toward the Chen administration. In short,China must live with Chen.
Chen's pledge to maintain the status quo and push for the establishment of a peaceful framework for cross-strait interaction should be treated seriously by Beijing. A window of opportunity for cross-strait reconciliation has opened. Both sides should take advantage of it.
Liu Kuan-teh is a political commentator based in Taipei.
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