What separates great leaders from good leaders is that great leaders can identify challenges and tackle them with vision and determination. President Chen Shui-bian's (
Chen is facing three major challenges: an antagonistic Beijing regime that has shown no respect for the newly re-elected president; a US-Taiwan relationship that is somewhat damaged by different views on Chen's push for a referendum; and a prolonged domestic entanglement over the election that originates from a lack of trust in the past four years.
Despite the fact that Beijing has not reacted in an extreme way to Chen's victory, it has used diplomatic as well as political means to sabotage Chen's new mandate. For example, soon after Chen was officially certified as the winner of the election, Beijing bought out Taiwan's diplomatic ally, Dominica. Moreover, Beijing's plan to dictate policy on political reform in Hong Kong -- which includes a proposal to directly elect the head of the Special Administrative Region by 2007 -- is regarded as a "preventive mechanism" to counter growing local consciousness.
Even though Chen has called for both sides of the Taiwan Strait to put aside the political deadlock and restart dialogue on a peace framework, China has poured cold water on Chen's new goodwill gesture. Chen will have to work hard to draw Beijing into a fair game.
When it comes to the question of repairing the strained Taipei-Washington relationship, Chen will have to reassure his American counterparts that the US will not be caught in the middle of a clash between Taiwanese consciousness and Chinese nationalism. In particular, he must make it clear that his desire to approve a new constitution by 2006 has no bearing on the status quo.
While urging the US to play a constructive role as mediator between Taipei and Beijing, Chen will have to explain to the US government what steps he will take to make cross-strait interaction workable and predictable.
Given that the US presidential election is approaching, Chen must work hard to restore Washington's trust and establish clear and candid channels of communication.
Because Chen pledged during the election that he would continue to reform and build trust in Taiwan, the first item on his domestic agenda must be to bridge the divisions in Taiwanese society that resulted from a heated election campaign.
As a country struggling to deepen democracy, Taiwan yearns for more discipline, structure and order in all aspects of its national life. Upset with political finger-pointing, a sense of political chaos and instability and sometimes-intentional political manipulation of ethnic problems, Taiwanese voters are looking for national reconciliation and leadership that can bring forth a mature civil society.
Last month's election displayed a public eagerness for more political stability, economic improvement, efficient government and well-established political institutions and rule of law.
By taking the theme of strength and unity and applying it to healthy political competition, anti-corruption efforts, economic rejuvenation, crime-fighting and government downsizing, Chen can win more support.
When his administration was criticized by the opposition as "the new kids in town" four years ago, Chen stepped out and launched a campaign based on love for Taiwan and a continued belief in reform. The 1.5 million additional votes that Chen received in this year's election represent a mandate for him. Making use of his popularity to advance cross-strait rapprochement, rejuvenate the US-Taiwan relationship and promote national harmony would position him to establish three major legacies during his time in office.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
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