On the evening of March 20, pan-blue supporters amassed in front of the Presidential Office to protest what they alleged to be an unfair election. Undoubtedly, the main political motivation behind this scene was grounded in the position of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) and People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) that the election results must be overturned. Lien and Soong launched bids for a recount, an inquiry into the assassination attempt on President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and Vice President Annette Lu (呂秀蓮) and a new election.
Obsessed with the tiny margin of votes, Lien and Soong have turned a blind eye to the changing political situation in Taiwan. This is the blind spot of the pan-blue's post-election reflection.
Many commentators claimed that the March 27 rally, peaceful and rational, with many middle-class, female and young participants, could serve as a new model for social movements. Some even proclaimed that "the north is blue and the south is green" and differentiated these two poles by "good and bad." They concluded that the supporters of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) lack education and are therefore easily manipulated, while the pan-blue supporters belong to the educated, urban middle class and are the core of society.
Similar arguments have been heard in the past. Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) described his supporters as being of higher class and better quality than his rivals. Championing his rivals thus became dishonorable. This prejudice seems to be confirmed by the pre-election poll data. There are clear geographic, educational and even generational differences between supporters of the two camps.
These differences, however, must not be confused with the electorate's "good or bad" quali-ties. What we need is to discuss who contributes more to the nation's democratization. Here are some points to be clarified:
First, let's address the argument that the urban middle-class tends to support the pan-blue camp. According to voter data, apart from a landslide victory in Kaohsiung City, the DPP received nearly 50 percent of the vote in Taichung City and gained a 10 percent increase in Taoyuan County. Except Taipei City and Taipei County, the number of DPP votes in urban areas climbed. Therefore, this argument should be revised as follows -- perhaps the urban bourgeoisie in northern cities are more sympathetic towards the pan-blue camp, but this is not the case in other cities, unless we deny the existence of an urban middle-class outside of Taipei City.
Second, we must examine the idea that people with advanced education are more likely to vote for pan-blue. We can see this issue from two angles: the first question is who is more enabled to achieve higher education; then we need to read the political and economic connotations of higher education. According to economist Luo Ming-ching's (
The children of Mainlanders and/or parents who served in government or were teachers were several times more likely to be admitted to universities. In the past when enrollment in universities was controlled, these social groups were given subsidies in the forms of low tuition fees.
Consequently, voters from a higher educational background do not necessarily have a more cultivated understanding of democracy, though they are more socially and economically privileged. As a result of class politics, a gap has emerged between these voters and others. In this sense, we should interpret the educational difference between the pan-blue and pan-green supporters through the looking glass of social development and political progress.
The prejudiced view that higher education is accompanied by nobler disposition should be cast off. We should highlight the fact that these class-related phenomena can not be explained away by a populist's manipulation. Rather, these class difference, in an aspect of social reform, bear a deeper significance, implying a crisis awareness on the part of groups enjoying vested interests.
Finally, what are the results of the younger generation's participation in politics? We must pay more attention to the progressive and reformative elements of the pan-blue camp platform. This will be key to winning the support of the younger generation. In particular, we must observe how a generation grows into a collective political force through the process of political socialization.
The student movement in the 1990s is an obvious example. The main point is not how many youngsters parties can mobilize, but rather if generational change can respond to the challenges of the changing political environ-ment. This is the yardstick to measure the two camp's political territory in the next generation.
Hsu Yung-ming is an assistant research fellow at the Sun Yat-sen Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy, Academia Sinica.
Translated by Wang Hsiao-wen
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