Today the Taiwan High Court begins its hearing of a lawsuit filed by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) against President Chen Shui-bian (
However, the question of who should pay the enormous costs associated with the judicial recount remains unsettled. Since the dispute is being handled through existing legal mechanisms, the answer to that question should of course have a legal and judicial basis.
It is not surprising that the KMT-People First Party (PFP) alliance is asking that the government pay the costs -- which are estimated to approach several hundred million NT dollars. This is because the recount is going to be an enormous project in which all 1,600 judges in the country as well as countless others will have to work intensely so the job can be finished in one day.
While it is unlikely that the KMT can't afford the bill -- it is still the richest political party on earth -- the KMT is of course reluctant to admit that it can pay, considering that during the campaign Chen proposed forcing it to return to the government and the people the money it embezzled.
But an even more important question is this: Is it right to have the government pay for this?
The Judicial Yuan doesn't think so. Judicial Yuan Civil Department Director Yang Lung-shun (
The most obvious rationale for this is to prevent frivolous lawsuits which could place undue burdens on the judicial system and waste judicial resources. Facing the possibility of having to pay expensive bills upon losing a lawsuit, plaintiffs will only seek a judicial remedy if they genuinely believe based on the evidence that their charges against the defendant can withstand judicial examination -- that is, if the defendant really did what the plaintiffs accuse him or her of doing.
Hasn't the KMT-PFP alliance said that it has received hundreds of tips from the public, along with loads of other evidence, indicating that the Democratic Progressive Party illegally tampered with the election and that the pan-blue camp is confident of winning the lawsuit? If all that is true, what is there for the KMT and PFP to fear?
Besides, the Judicial Yuan's ruling is a knife that could cut both ways -- meaning the DPP will have to pick up the tab if it loses the recount.
Could it be that the KMT-PFP alliance is not at all sure of the merits of its lawsuit? Is it possible that the pan-blue camp realizes that the DPP's extremely small winning margin -- 0.228 percent -- does not indicate any wrongdoing by the DPP, but rather that the nation simply had a very close election?
Finally, the KMT-PFP alliance should be reminded that at least 50 percent of the population -- namely, those who voted for Chen -- believe that the president has done nothing illegal. Is it fair to ask them to pay for the judicial recount?
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