The March 20 election and the referendum are over. President Chen Shui-bian (
First, Taiwan's mainstream opinion was clearly shown during the election process, as both camps emphasized Taiwan's self-awareness, the Republic of China (ROC) as an independent sovereign state and their opposition to unification, the principle of "one country, two systems," and the restoration of cross-strait negotiations on the premise of the "one China" principle.
During his campaign, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) said that he would not bring up the "1992 consensus" anymore, and that there is one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait at present. Even Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平), who was Lien's campaign chief, said that Taiwan's independence could also be a future option.
Second, although less than half of the voters participated in the referendum, those who voted "yes" to the questions accounted for 92 percent of all referendum participants, showing a very high degree of consensus.
Given the pan-blue camp's boycott of the referendum, the consensus showed green-camp voters' support for the government's proposals.
After the election Chen said the government will follow the people's decision by proposing concrete measures regarding the two questions: "strengthen national defense" and "initiate equal negotiations." This was a response to the recognition of his supporters.
Chen's government is now likely to accept neither the "one China" principle nor the "1992 consensus." During his campaign, he pointed out that future constitutional reforms will be carried out on the basis of "maintaining the status quo" as well as the "five noes." He's therefore likely to keep his promise of the "five noes" in the face of US pressure while maintaining cross-strait stability.
Moreover, in the second referendum question, he stressed that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait should build a "peace and stability framework for cross-strait inter-actions" and begin negotiations starting from economic issues. Last August, he said that he hopes to complete negotiations for the opening of direct transportation links by the end of this year. Thus, Taiwan seems to be willing to promptly negotiate with China on the direct-link issue.
From China's perspective, Beijing's goal is to maintain cross-strait stability, so that it can concentrate on domestic economic development and maintaining its social stability.
Based on this premise, Beijing adopted a policy of "listening to Chen's words and watching his actions" from 2000 to this year, wishing that the blue camp and Washington could restrain the pro-Taiwan independence policies of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government. Meanwhile, Beijing adopted a looser definition of the "one China" principle, and stopped making it the premise for direct-link negotiations. It also re-defined such links from domestic to cross-strait links, so as to face the new political reality in Taiwan and to win the Taiwanese people's support.
Prior to March 20, Beijing defined the election as a local one, believing that it has successfully maintained the "one China" principle and framework in the international community. Moreover, China's Taiwan Affairs Office commented on the referendum results on the morning of March 21, saying that "the failure of the referendum showed that this illegal action failed to win people's hearts."
This tells us that we know that Beijing has found a good excuse, claiming that its Taiwan policy was successful. It will not carry out any military threats or actions regarding the election or the referendum results.
Given that the pan-blue camp's force will largely shrink after the election, Chen will rule for the next four years and mainstream opinion was clearly demonstrated in the election as well as the referendum, Beijing will pragmatically change its policy, and even start interactions with Chen's government.
Besides, the pan-blue camp's constraint on the government will weaken, so Beijing will have to rely on Washington to restrict Taipei more -- especially on the issue of Chen's promise of creating a new constitution by 2006.
Finally, in its propaganda last year for the opening of direct links, Beijing reaffirmed that the "one China" principle is not the premise of cross-strait negotiations, and merely defined the links as cross-strait links, not domestic ones. Therefore, the two sides will have a chance to carry out talks on direct links and other economic issues.
Although cross-strait relations remain uncertain, the overall development of relations is expected to remain stable. Although the domestic political deadlock is unlikely to be resolved anytime soon, China's Taiwan policy will become more and more flexible, while Taiwan's China policy will be restricted by the world's leading powers. A breakthrough in economic talks may also occur, which will gradually decrease the hostility between the two sides.
Tung Chen-yuan is an associate research fellow at the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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