It was good to see most participants involved in the protest in front of the Presidential Office leave for the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, where, although the protest will continue, at least it will no longer occupy a major intersection and won't create as great a traffic obstruction for Taipei residents.
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT)-People First Party (PFP) alliance faced enormous internal and external pressure to peacefully end the rally in front of the Presidential Office. The greatest pressure resulted from the violent confrontation that took place Friday night in front of the Central Election Commission (CEC) between Taipei police and hundreds of pan-blue supporters led by PFP lawmakers. Protesters were trying to keep the CEC from posting an announcement of the presidential election result. In addition to incurring uniform condemnation from both the public and the news media, the violent episode stirred increasing skepticism about the KMT-PFP alliance's ability to keep their supporters under control and prevent further violence.
Then there was the statement issued by Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office on Friday, declaring that "if the situation gets out of control in Taiwan ... we will not sit idly by." Over the past week, some people have expressed concern that if the demonstrations escalated into civil unrest, China would be presented with a golden opportunity to use force. While the pan-blue camp ignored such warnings, it could not do the same when it came to Beijing's statement. This naturally increased pressure on the pan-blue side.
In addition, there was the statement from the White House early Saturday morning that not only congratulated President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) on his re-election but also condemned the use of violence and called for the resolution of challenges to the election result through "existing legal mechanisms." The truth of the matter -- as can be seen in comments by US State Department Spokesperson Richard Boucher on Monday and in statements issued by the White House over the weekend of the election -- is that the US repeatedly emphasized the resolution of disputes through existing legal mechanisms. Until Friday, the pan-blue camp had simply decided to ignore that message.
The right of the pan-blue supporters to assemble and express their views should be respected. However, such demands can be dealt with through existing legal mechanisms. The law provides for a judicial recount of the votes. The police are investigating the shooting of Chen and Vice President Annette Lu (呂秀蓮). The problem is that the pan-blue camp doesn't want to wait for the judicial recount and doesn't even seem to trust the police investigation. But then, considering that Chen has agreed to amend the law to allow for an immediate recount and has agreed to the establishment of an independent task force to investigate the shooting, one fails to see what legitimacy remains in the pan-blue camp's protests.
Many pan-blue politicians are comparing the protest with the Kaohsiung Incident and are exalting protests by political dissidents -- many of whom later became important members of the Democratic Progressive Party -- as an important milestone leading to the democratization of the nation. But this is comparing apples and oranges. At the time of the Kaohsiung Incident, Taiwan was still under martial law and the KMT's one-party totalitarianism. People's demands for democracy and freedom had no way of being met through the legal system that then existed.
Yet today, after more than a decade of democratization and reform, with an opposition legislative majority, open and transparent elections and vibrant press freedoms in Taiwan, there is no legitimacy in seeking a resolution of differences outside existing legal mechanisms.
It is hoped that the protesters will listen to Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou's (
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