To many witnessing Taiwan's boisterous election campaign, this topic may seem arcane, even uncharitable. The phrase "free and fair" has become a buzzword for the international community that a country's elections meet certain democratic standards. Surely Taiwan's do? Perhaps, but such a laden term must be used with the utmost caution.
For example, in Cambodia (where the Taiwan Network for Free Elections has recently taken part in international election observation missions), misuse of the phrase has caused serious controversy, both domestically and internationally.
Thus, observers have learned to weigh their statements carefully and rely on rigorous and objective analysis.
If we apply the same standards to Taiwan, we would find that, despite the undeniably major improvements since the martial law era, there are still significant issues of concern.
The "freedom" of elections describes the possibility of voters making a real choice of their own free will. In Taiwan, the most blatant violations in this area, such as banning parties or candidates or unduly restricting their activities, are now essentially a thing of the past.
Election "freedom" also requires the secrecy of the ballot; if voters worry about whether the state or any party or even any individual know how they voted, then the elections cannot be said to be fully "free."
Here, too, Taiwan has made considerable progress. Since the end of martial law, the main issue has been vote-buying and intimidation by "black gold" elements, and there is evidence that these have been steadily decreasing in frequency and severity.
Turning to "fairness," which is the extent to which there is a level playing field, we find much more to criticize in Taiwan. To start with, the fact that one political party possesses an enormous pile of assets is sufficient to make it impossible for any Taiwanese election to date to be described as "fully fair."
A related problem, abused by all parties, is the almost absolute non-transparency of campaign finances. In this regard, a priority for improving the quality of Taiwan's democracy is the passage of strong "sunshine laws."
Second, the enforcement of electoral regulations leaves much to be desired and this will become increasingly important as tougher laws are enacted. Although the central and local election authorities have developed a high degree of administrative competence, they have yet to establish solid credibility as impartial enforcement bodies.
Likewise, while the judicial system has recently shown more determination to stamp out low-level abuses, such as vote-buying, there is still insufficient public persuasion that "big fish" violators (major candidates, party headquarters, etc.) would be treated objectively and neutrally.
A third area of "fairness" concerns the media, an essential component of the playing field. While the media market has been greatly liberalized and state censorship has ended, Taiwan's media still fall far short of the ideal of a neutral "fourth estate" providing balanced and objective information to citizens.
Examples of abuses include capture by special interests, lack of professionalism (such as fact-checking) and emphasis on subjective opinions rather than objective data (such as reporting public issues in a simplistic "he said, she said" format).
In this year's campaign, we have seen a new emphasis on "technical neutrality," where news outlets claim to give candidates the same amount of coverage. This is a low standard of media objectivity (for example, it's an important issue in Cambodia), and the fact that it is salient in Taiwan only indicates how far we have to go.
Finally, this year the biggest change in the nation's electoral politics is, of course, the referendum. Although in general this represents a deepening of democracy, in practical terms it has also brought a few new clouds on the horizon.
Some of these are problems of the quality of referendums themselves, notably their manipulation by political parties. However, there are also new concerns about the overall freedom and fairness of elections.
For example, the normally staid Central Election Commission (CEC) and local election authorities have turned into political battlegrounds.
At a minimum, the resulting frequent changes of electoral procedures almost up to election day will result in some degradation of Taiwan's traditionally super-efficient polling administration, possibly confusing or upsetting some voters.
More worryingly, there is a risk of such politicization stunting the healthy development of these key agencies.
Moreover, the fact that the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has called on voters to boycott the referendum has raised new concerns about the secrecy of the ballot.
Whereas most Taiwanese voters have gradually become confident that no one could find out how they voted, they now face the possibility of pressure or inducements from either side over whether they voted.
Two decisions by the CEC have directly impacted this issue. On the one hand, the adoption of the KMT-promoted "two-stage" voting (also known, unhelpfully, as the "U-shaped" format) significantly facilitates party and faction operatives in and around polling stations to monitor whether voters are participating in the referendum.
Given the former prevalence of vote-buying, intimidation and other forms of pressure (by employers, for example), there is every reason to be concerned that these time-honored tactics could be brought to bear on the issue of participation in or boycott of the referendum. It is quite possible that voters, especially those who have previously experienced such pressure, may well adjust their choices as a result.
On the other hand, the CEC made a positive decision, albeit at the last minute, to drop the idea of marking voter's ID cards separately for the presidential and referendum ballots. This would have seriously threatened ballot secrecy by creating an ideal mechanism of control -- not only black-and-white, but permanent and non-concealable.
All people concerned with the health of Taiwan's democracy should monitor these developments energetically. Although Taiwan has certainly made great strides in democratization, this is no time for complacency.
Bo Tedards is a co-coordinator of the Taiwan Network for Free Elections.
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