President Chen Shui-bian (
But even if Chen had backed down and withdrawn that proposal, this election would still be a pseudo-referendum on the future status of Taiwan.
This is not because people in Taiwan are in a rush to make that decision -- quite the contrary.
Under the status quo of de facto independence, Taiwanese people enjoy their highest standard of living ever. They are literate and ambitious and have arrived as a free and open democracy. Despite diplomatic isolation imposed from Beijing, they have also arrived as a significant economic player in several key industries.
No one in the world is more in favor of maintaining the status quo than the Taiwanese.
But the gathering threat from across the Strait demands a response, and the candidates present a polarized, binary choice between a status quo that leans toward independence someday and a status quo that leans toward unification someday.
The choice between unification and independence is nothing new.
The Mainland Affairs Council has conducted running surveys on this and many other cross-strait issues for over a decade. What's new in this election is the urgency of China's demands for capitulation, and the 496 ballistic missiles it has deployed as inducement.
China has declared its intention to take Taiwan by force "if necessary," and for several years has been steadily building up the military means to do so. It is possible the moment of truth could come during the presidency of whichever candidate wins the balloting next month. Given their parties' fundamental leanings, the two candidates will surely handle Taiwan's dealings with China in completely different ways.
In either case, the status quo is likely to change in some way during the next four years -- not on the question of independence or unification, but at other levels. Domestically, the demand for constitutional reform is on the rise. In foreign affairs, there is demand for increased participation in international organizations. At the cross-strait level, there is both demand for and fear of direct travel and postal and transport agreements with China -- the so-called "three links."
Direct links would be an economic windfall for Taiwan, which already accounts for 20 percent of China's foreign direct investment, twice that of the No. 2 investor, the US. But the direct links would also open the door wide to a sneak attack from China, just 145km away. This is the dilemma facing voters on March 20. Without question, direct commerce with China is essential to Taiwan's future, but unless Beijing renounces the use of force, direct commerce requires a level of trust which totalitarian China has repeatedly shown it does not merit.
Both presidential candidates support direct links, but Chen favors a more cautious approach than the "pan-blue" ticket led by Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan (
Chen's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and former president Lee Teng-hui's (
There is deep-seated mistrust between the staunchest pan-green and pan-blue supporters, a remnant of the brutal subjugation of Taiwanese by some Mainlanders in the early years of KMT rule. But the vast majority of the electorate carries no grudge, and wishes only to move on from the past.
This moderate majority is not driven so much by the ideological passions of independence or unification, but by concerns over the economy, education, employment and other familiar issues. The undecided are torn between the pros and cons of both candidates. Chen's campaign evinces national pride, but his handling of the economy is openly scoffed at. Although Lien and Soong are seen as more capable in governing, their competence is tarnished by years of "black-gold" corruption and too-cozy associations with Beijing.
It is possible that Chen could lose the pseudo-referendum and win the real one.
Voters might elect the pan-blue ticket, signalling a desire for greater economic integration with China, but also approve Chen's "defensive" referendums, which would require the government to establish a peaceful framework for negotiations with China (essentially a call for China to renounce the threat of attack) and call for increased military spending if China should refuse to do so. That would indeed be an interesting, mixed message.
John Diedrichs is new-media editor for the Taipei Times.
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