President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) early announcement of the referendum questions is certainly a strategic move. Most importantly, he wants to put the US at ease. The two referendum questions have not deviated from US policy, so the US will have no reason to oppose them. Thus, the diplomatic pressure that Taiwan has faced over holding a referendum is relieved.
Although the two referendum questions are neither new nor impressive, the point is that the people of Taiwan can finally vote in a referendum, which is a vital demonstration of the nation's sovereignty. That is why China, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the People First Party (PFP) oppose it.
The KMT and PFP always complain that their motives are being misunderstood, but why do they always side with communist China on the issue of the nation's status and sovereignty?
Take the Referendum Law (公民投票法) for example -- Beijing publicly denounced it as a move to claim independence. The KMT and PFP also criticized it as a violation of the Constitution and tried to resist it in counties ruled by them. We can say that Beijing is an overt villain and the pan-blues are hypocrites. And they work together to prevent Taiwan from holding a referendum.
We can do nothing about opposition from Beijing, nor do we need to. But we can rebuke the pan-blues for their belief that holding a referendum violates the Constitution.
First, the Referendum Law was passed by the legislature after three readings. Commonly referred to as a "defensive" or "peace" referendum," Article 17 entitles the president to initiate a referendum on national security issues, so the referendum can be defensive or offensive in nature. Chen and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) employ the term "peace referendum" to make the mechanism more powerful and flexible in its use.
Second, Article 17 entitles the president to initiate a referendum "whenever the country is faced by an external threat that could interfere with national sover-eignty." So as long as there is a "possibility" of such a threat, the president is entitled to hold a referendum. According to the law, the president has to make the decision on whether a referendum should be held, but this decision has to be approved by the Executive Yuan. So the final decision does not rest on the president's subjective judgment alone -- a check mechanism is still in place. Although, practically speaking, the Executive Yuan's approval is only a procedure, it is not fair to say that law endows the president with dictatorial powers.
According to Article 17, there is no violation of the Constitution in Chen's initiation of a referendum. The KMT and PFP oppose the referendum simply to please China. That's why they make up the excuse about violation of the Constitution. But all they are doing is showing the public who they really are.
Chin Heng-wei is editor in chief of Contemporary Monthly magazine.
Translated by Jennie Shih
The conflict in the Middle East has been disrupting financial markets, raising concerns about rising inflationary pressures and global economic growth. One market that some investors are particularly worried about has not been heavily covered in the news: the private credit market. Even before the joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran on Feb. 28, global capital markets had faced growing structural pressure — the deteriorating funding conditions in the private credit market. The private credit market is where companies borrow funds directly from nonbank financial institutions such as asset management companies, insurance companies and private lending platforms. Its popularity has risen since
The Donald Trump administration’s approach to China broadly, and to cross-Strait relations in particular, remains a conundrum. The 2025 US National Security Strategy prioritized the defense of Taiwan in a way that surprised some observers of the Trump administration: “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.” Two months later, Taiwan went entirely unmentioned in the US National Defense Strategy, as did military overmatch vis-a-vis China, giving renewed cause for concern. How to interpret these varying statements remains an open question. In both documents, the Indo-Pacific is listed as a second priority behind homeland defense and
Every analyst watching Iran’s succession crisis is asking who would replace supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Yet, the real question is whether China has learned enough from the Persian Gulf to survive a war over Taiwan. Beijing purchases roughly 90 percent of Iran’s exported crude — some 1.61 million barrels per day last year — and holds a US$400 billion, 25-year cooperation agreement binding it to Tehran’s stability. However, this is not simply the story of a patron protecting an investment. China has spent years engineering a sanctions-evasion architecture that was never really about Iran — it was about Taiwan. The
In an op-ed published in Foreign Affairs on Tuesday, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) said that Taiwan should not have to choose between aligning with Beijing or Washington, and advocated for cooperation with Beijing under the so-called “1992 consensus” as a form of “strategic ambiguity.” However, Cheng has either misunderstood the geopolitical reality and chosen appeasement, or is trying to fool an international audience with her doublespeak; nonetheless, it risks sending the wrong message to Taiwan’s democratic allies and partners. Cheng stressed that “Taiwan does not have to choose,” as while Beijing and Washington compete, Taiwan is strongest when