While the recent armed conflict in the Middle East has unburdened the Iraqi people of a brutal dictator, it has also provided clear evidence of shifting geopolitical and economic realities. In particular, it should be clear to American policy-makers and pundits that the center of economic gravity has shifted away from Europe.
While the transatlantic partnership remains important, a proper sense of proportion confirms that the US' allies in Asia, especially Japan and South Korea, are becoming increasingly important components in the search for global stability.
ILLUSTRATION: YU SHA
It is unsurprising, considering the US' historical links with Europe and the ancestral ties of the majority of its citizens to Europe, that the US' foreign policy tends to display a distinct Eurocentricity. This bias has proved to be counterproductive, given the brow-beating and teeth-gnashing concerning the rift between the US and France and Germany relating to actions taken in Iraq.
Yet these concerns about the US' relationship with certain European countries ignore some basic realities.
Indeed, worries over unpleasant exchanges with France and Germany tend to overshadow the fact that many other European countries joined the "coalition of the willing." Besides the 12,000 troops from Britain, European countries that contributed to the multinational force are Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Spain, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine. And logistical support is provided by Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal.
While editorialists and politicians anguish over the insensitivities of the administration of US President George W. Bush toward the French and the Germans, the US' allies in Asia have stepped up to the plate. In particular, the democratically elected governments of both Japan and South Korea have been generally supportive of US policy in Iraq and have pledged materiel and manpower.
In the cases of Japan and Korea, their momentous decisions came despite incidents that brought shock and mourning to their people because of the assassination of some of their citizens in Iraq. In November, several Japanese diplomats and South Korean reconstruction engineers were gunned down by irregular forces in separate attacks. And as in other countries, the governments offered their support while under considerable pressure of protesters urging them to avoid further entanglements in Iraq.
It is instructive to weigh up the relative importance of some of the US' Asian protagonists against its recent European antagonists. In terms of various rankings, it appears that the focus on France and Germany is exaggerated.
From the standpoint of economic importance, Japan contributes significantly more than either Germany or France on its own. But even when the GDP of the two European powerhouses is combined (just over US$3.7 trillion), it is only a smidgen more than is Japan's alone (US$3.55 trillion). Adding South Korea's GDP (US$931 billion) to Japan's GDP means that together they are significantly more important as economic forces than the European counterparts.
It is also true that Japan's population (over 127 million) is larger than either France's (60 million) or Germany's (82 million). If Korea's population is added to Japan's, they represent a larger mass of humanity that the total in both France and Germany.
For its part, Seoul finalized a plan to send a 3,000-strong contingent to Iraq to help US-led reconstruction project. Although the plan must await approval by parliament, it seems likely since a multiparty consensus has been reached on the commitment and the troops will arrive in March or April.
As it is, South Korea already has 700 medics and military engineers stationed in Nasiriyah in southern Iraq. Half of the new South Korean force will be combatants from its Special Forces Command and Marine Corps. And there will be an additional 100 civilians included in the dispatch.
In the case of Japan, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi authorized sending Self-Defense Forces (SDF) units to Iraq, the first Japanese troops sent to a nation effectively at war. Polls indicate that about 63 percent of Japanese citizens support the decision.
It is expected that about 600 SDF troops will be deployed late next month to engage in reconstruction efforts in "non-combat areas" to avoid conflicts with constitutional restraints on using troops. But the SDF troops will be heavily armed and able to defend themselves.
Other Asian countries have also contributed to the efforts in Iraq. Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines each also sent several hundred of their military and police personnel while Australia sent just under 1,000 soldiers. Although these commitments of manpower are not numerically significant, it is part of an important show of solidarity with the US-led coalition efforts to rebuild Iraq and create a democratic government in the country.
Besides the manpower support, Japan and Korea also put money on the line. Tokyo has pledged US$5 billion in new grants and loans by 2007 for reconstruction. And in recent discussions with US special envoy James Baker, Tokyo indicated a willingness to forgive much of approximately US$7 billion in sovereign debt and interest owed by Iraq. The condition set by Japan's government was that other Paris Club members, a group of 19 creditor nations holding large claims on various debtor countries, act in a similar manner. Following this lead, Seoul indicated a willingness to void its outstanding government credits of US$200 million to Iraq.
It is well known that French and German leaders acted to bolster their domestic political support rather than engage in principled opposition to despotism and terrorism. It was bad enough that withholding support by these European countries for coalition actions in Iraq were viewed as more important than they were. But willful omission by much of the US and European media of reports of the steady support of Asian allies for the efforts in Iraq was a gratuitous insult and a denigration of the efforts of the US' closest friends.
Christopher Lingle is professor of economics at Universidad Francisco Marroque in Guatemala.
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