Tue, Jan 06, 2004 page9

• Russia only wishes Georgia success in its difficult struggle

  • By Felix Stanevsky
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  Mikhail Saakashvili's victory in Georgia's presidential election was the predictable culmination of November's "Revolution of the Roses," which forced Eduard Shevardnadze to step down after more than a decade in power. A more complicated question is what Georgia's northern neighbor, Russia, should expect from the new power triumvirate of Saakashvili, Nino Burdzhanadze, and Zurab Zhvania.

  Despite Russia's post-Soviet malaise, it has influenced Georgia's internal development at virtually every turn -- including Shevardnadze's resignation, which was mediated by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov -- so how it perceives Georgia's new leaders is of crucial geopolitical significance. The three Georgian leaders declare bilateral relations a high priority, and in Russia, too, there is widespread hope that their victory will help repair ties between the two countries.

  But there is also concern about the previous occasional anti-Russian statements of this new generation of leaders, and fear that President Saakashvili might launch a military campaign to bring the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia back under Tbilisi's rule. As Russia's arch-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky put it, "At least Shevardnadze was still our man," while the new leaders "will flood Abkhazia and South Ossetia with blood."

  Although most Russians do not share this view, Russia is obviously concerned with the security threat that it faces from the South Caucasus -- a threat that escalated sharply during Shevardnadze's rule. Most alarmingly, Chechen rebels enjoyed considerable freedom of operation in Georgia, creating supply bases on its territory and receiving medical help in Georgian hospitals before slipping back into Russia.

  This support was clearly sanctioned at the highest levels of Georgia's government. The Chechen separatists' leader, Aslan Maskhadov, maintained a mission directly next door to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Tbilisi, and various government bodies had direct contacts with Chechen field commanders operating in Georgia. In the fall of 2001, for example, Georgian security officials provided transportation for the Chechen field commander Ruslan Gelaev from the Pankisi Gorge to Abkhazia.

  Georgia's new leaders have opposed such cooperation with the Chechen rebels. So it is to be hoped that they will take Russia's security concerns seriously, possibly providing partnership in controlling Georgian roads leading into Chechnya. For too long, these roads have served as arteries for international terrorism, conveying fighters and financing into Russia from the Arab world and other countries.

  But Saakashvili and his allies are all young. Do they have enough experience to guide the country towards political stability and economic prosperity? Their desire to preserve and reestablish Georgian territorial integrity by asserting renewed control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia is understandable, but can they accomplish this goal as peacefully as they won their revolution?

  Despite frequent accusations to the contrary, Georgia's viability as an independent state is very much in Russia's interests. Talk of re-establishing the Soviet Union or at least absorbing Abkhazia and South Ossetia has always been politically marginal. But the fact remains that both Abkhaz and South Ossetian leaders have occasionally approached Russia with annexation requests. Georgia's current economic collapse provides little incentive for either of these self-proclaimed independent republics to support reunification.

  Similarly, Georgia's inability to manage relations with its only autonomous republic, Adzharia, doesn't inspire much confidence. The Adzhar people consider themselves Georgians, but still have frequent squabbles with the central government, so how could ethnically distinct Abkhazia and South Ossetia feel assured that their relations with Georgia would work out any better?

  President Saakashvili seems to understand the necessity of reviving Georgia's moribund economy, which requires, first and foremost, political stability. But he is unlikely to refrain from accusing Russia of stoking tensions with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia was once blamed for arranging earthquakes in Georgia, so it would be difficult to resist accusing it of support for anti-Georgian separatists.

  This allegation is as baseless as the temptation to make it is strong. Simply put, it would be suicidal for Russia, having itself just stepped back from the brink of territorial disintegration, to build its strength on the collapse of its neighbor.

  Indeed, the Saakashvili administration might complain about Russian meddling, but it is unlikely to try to remove Georgia from Russia's economic orbit. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline -- which will bypass Russia when it is completed -- cannot re-define the country's economic strategy to the extent that Shevardnadze had sought. Instead, Georgia's long-term economic success will depend on exports to the Russian market: neither Georgia's wine nor its fruit is needed in the US or Italy.

  Let there be no mistake: Georgia's new leaders face daunting economic, political, and constitutional challenges in the years ahead. But Russia wishes them success. For if they can overcome these challenges quickly, thoroughly, and peacefully, the election of Mikhail Saakashvili will be good news not only for Georgia, but for Russia as well.

  Felix Stanevsky is a former Russian ambassador to Georgia. Copyright: Project Syndicate
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