With the the presidential election rapidly approaching, "reconciliation" is a topic that has been mentioned quite frequently recently by both the pan-green camp, including President Chen Shui-bian (
The pan-blue camp obviously equated the flag-raising ceremony with a campaign rally, and mobilized more than 10,000 supporters to attend the ceremony with Lien and People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜), who attended the occasion for the first time since their election defeat in 2000.
In contrast, from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), only a small number of government and party officials accompanied Chen and Vice President Annette Lu (
About two weeks ago, during a televised talk on the economic policies of the KMT and PFP, Lien indicated that the "illusory" political status of Taiwan as defined by the DPP conflicted with the economic status of Taiwan, obstructing the economic development of the country. Lien also said that in the future the pan-blue camp proposes to facilitate stability and prosperity with economic policies based on major "reconciliation," development and construction.
Around the same time, Chen indicated during a meeting with party representatives that after the election the DPP will open its heart and leave behind all the hatred and grudges developed during the election.
Unfortunately, despite the rosy picture painted by the both camps, and the genuine need of Taiwan for heartfelt reconciliation -- not only between political parties and camps but also between ethnic groups -- it is probably naive to think that everyone can let bygones be bygones once the election is over.
If the goal of interparty reconciliation is truly attainable, why didn't it happen after the 2000 presidential election? The reason is that the KMT, and as a matter of fact the entire pan-blue camp, was incapable of accepting defeat.
The so-called "reconciliation" between the KMT and PFP is no reconciliation at all. Instead, it is a marriage of convenience and for mutual survival and interests.
In view of the fact that this time the vote margin might be even smaller than last time, the likelihood of reconciliation seems more remote than it did after the last election. And this is not to mention that the wounds the parties have inflicted on each other over the past four years have only made things worse.
Then there is the issue of ethnic rivalry, which continues to be deeply embedded in Taiwan's politics. Interestingly enough, things are different here from how they are in other ethnically or racially diverse countries, where the majority and the minority groups tend to vote for members of their own groups.
In Taiwan, the ethnic majority -- the local Taiwanese people -- often vote across ethnic lines, as evidenced by the high level of popular support for Taipei City Mayor Ma Ying-jeou (
However, the minority group -- the ethnic mainlanders -- perhaps feel intimidated and rarely vote outside of their group.
How much time will it take to resolve this inter-group rivalry and animosity? No one knows. But these problems will not vanish overnight on March 20.
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