As a naturalized US citizen and a native of Taiwan teaching at a US university, Dec. 9 was a sad day. On the eve of International Human Rights Day, US President George W. Bush, with the visiting Chinese premier at his side, stated, "We oppose any unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo. And the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose."
I had believed that this country was founded on the principles of liberty, equality and democracy -- values inculcated in every US citizen, born here or naturalized. But Bush's comments made me wonder whether the US' promotion of democracy only applies when it suits US interests.
Since Taiwan's democratization has progressed too fast for the comfort and convenience of the US, it must be reined in. Previously, Bush showed strategic and moral clarity regarding Tai-wan, exemplified by his April 2001 remarks: "We will do whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend itself," which contributed to the simultaneous improvement of ties with both Beijing and Taipei -- an underappreciated feat that no previous administration had been able to achieve.
Now, the exigencies of the war on terror, the quagmire in Iraq, and the crisis over North Korea appear to have caused Bush to abandon a policy that reflected the US' values.
Many Americans have sympathy for Taiwan as a democratic quasi-ally that has achieved an economic miracle and built a vibrant democracy amid perennial threats and pressure from China, and Bush is known for his empathy with the Taiwanese people. He has also justified his war on terror and his rebuilding Iraq in the name of preserving freedom and spreading democracy.
It is thus puzzling why Bush came down so hard on President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), whose sin was to propose a referendum coinciding with next March's presidential election that calls on China to withdraw its missiles aimed at Taiwan and renounce the use of force.
A public rebuke of a democratic ally in an obvious ingratiation of the leader of a regime seeking to absorb one of the US' staunchest friends -- by force, if necessary, without any public reprimand of China's coercive diplomacy -- makes it increasingly clear that Bush now views Taiwan's ballot box as more threatening than China's missiles.
US policymakers often tout how the one-China policy, en-shrined since the Nixon-Kissinger years, has enabled the US to improve its relations with China, whose cooperation on many international issues the US needs, and how it has helped Taiwan prosper economically and democratize politically, albeit under an ambiguous status. The implicit message is that the patron (the US) has been magnanimous, and the client (Taiwan) should be more grateful.
But gratitude should go both ways. During the Cold War, the US used its support of the Republic of China as the legal government of all China as a tool to contain communist China.
With detente, former US president Richard Nixon visited the PRC in 1972 and signed the Shanghai Communique, which paved the way for normalization of relations between the two countries.
But the framework that would be used to govern US policy toward Taiwan for the next three decades -- the diplomatic fiction that the US acknowledges that all Chinese on each side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of China -- not only lacked any input from Taiwanese people, whose fate was affected, but is out of sync with Taiwan's fast-democratizing polity.
Yet Bush has now bluntly told the Taiwanese to continue accepting a formula that serves US convenience and interests but is made without Taiwanese consent. The root problem lies in Beijing's refusal to acknowledge Taiwan as a separate and sovereign country and its insistence that all major powers and international organizations adhere to its one-China worldview.
But the US, with its power and prestige, should be able to set a better example than perpetuating a diplomatic fiction and chastising anybody who points out the obvious.
I recently met my relatives in Shanghai for the first time. It was a warm occasion. They sincerely told me that Taiwan would eventually return to the motherland. I had enough respect for them to tell them that most people in Taiwan do not want to join China -- at least now, when China still has an authoritarian and nationalist government that threatens Taiwan, and that their textbooks had failed them by telling only half-truths.
We in the US teach our children that US foreign policy reflects this country's democratic values. How can we explain our Taiwan policy to them?
Vincent Wang is a political science professor at the University of Richmond and author of numerous articles on Taiwan and China.
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The Hong Kong government on Monday gazetted sweeping amendments to the implementation rules of Article 43 of its National Security Law. There was no legislative debate, no public consultation and no transition period. By the time the ink dried on the gazette, the new powers were already in force. This move effectively bypassed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The rules were enacted by the Hong Kong chief executive, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security — a body shielded from judicial review and accountable only to Beijing. What is presented as “procedural refinement” is, in substance, a shift away from
Taiwan no longer wants to merely manufacture the chips that power artificial intelligence (AI). It aims to build the software, platforms and services that run on them. Ten major AI infrastructure projects, a national cloud computing center in Tainan, the sovereign language model Trustworthy AI Dialogue Engine, five targeted industry verticals — from precision medicine to smart agriculture — and the goal of ranking among the world’s top five in computing power by 2040: The roadmap from “Silicon Island” to “Smart Island” is drawn. The question is whether the western plains, where population, industry and farmland are concentrated, have the water and
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan