In politics, hypocrisy is not a flaw. It is a strategy that helps a country hide its goals. One problem with this sort of hypocrisy, however, is that a hidden agenda can create miscalculations.
And that is what is happening in the Taiwan Strait, as all the players involved -- Taipei, Beijing and Washington -- have dual policies.
President Chen Shui-bian (
But ever since the Legislative Yuan passed the Referendum Law (
The contradiction concealed within Chen's statements is that there would be no obstacle to Taiwanese independence if China were to remove those missiles, since they are the main factor deterring the nation from declaring independence.
At first glance, Chen's rhetoric looks like a part of a strategy to garner more votes.
In reality, however, it is also part of his strategy of creeping toward independence.
Chen's intentions are clearly betrayed by the issues he has so far suggested be put on the referendum ballot: they are all related to cross-strait relations. Chen has left aside issues such as the reduction of the number of seats in the Legislative Yuan or the fate of the fourth nuclear plant, both of which are purely domestic issues.
Any referendum on issues depicting China as an enemy would create an atmosphere of hostile coexistence, as opposed to the atmosphere of peaceful coexistence that might be created through the establishment of direct links. An atmosphere of hostile coexistence will make reunification with China more difficult.
China, of course, has also employed a dual policy in the Taiwan Strait.
It still considers military intervention an option but it has not flexed its muscles recently as it has in the past.
Top Chinese leaders have been moderate in their statements, allowing officials who have less visibility on the international stage to make the harshest criticisms.
Wang Zaixi (
Similarly, Major General Peng Guangqian (
There are two main reasons for China's dual policy.
First, it is aware that rattling its sabers would only contribute to boosting Chen's popularity and his re-election chances. Second, China does not want to jeopardize the charm offensive it has launched in order to assert its status as a cooperative and responsible power. Beijing's self-restraint, to a certain extent, has encouraged Chen to take bolder steps.
Had Beijing taken a firmer stand before Chen's visit to New York and Alaska, Washington might not have given him as much leeway during his trip as it did.
But of all the players in the Taiwan Strait, the US is the most ambivalent one.
Washington says it does not support Taiwanese independence and is "opposed to any referendum that would change Taiwan's status."
Yet it also claims that the use of referendums and rewriting the constitution are domestic Taiwanese politics, even though they might mention Taiwan's sovereignty.
The US is ambivalent not just on the Taiwan issue. It is also not clear in its ties with Beijing and Taipei.
Washington currently carries out a policy of constructive diplomatic engagement with China, which is an official US ally. President George W. Bush, however, recently sent a personal letter to Chen pledging support for Taiwan's bid to become an observer at the World Health Organization.
How is it that Bush has communicated directly with Chen if Washington does not have formal ties with Taipei?
The US' dual policy played an important role in letting Chen think that he had room to push the envelope, which he went on doing as long as Washington did not openly say that it opposed Taiwanese independence.
China, in the past, assumed that pressuring Washington was the best way to influence Taiwan on sensitive issues. Now it perceives the US' two-faced policy as more favorable to Taipei than to Beijing. China feels betrayed because it has cooperated with the US on Iraq and North Korea.
The worst scenario imaginable would be to have China draw the conclusion that the US wants to thwart its rise as a regional power and that Taiwan is a stumbling block that the US has set up for it in Southeast Asia.
The situation in the Taiwan Strait is more volatile now than before, not just because Taiwan, China and the US have hidden agendas, but also because the position of all the players on the chessboard is changing.
In military terms, the balance of power is gradually shifting in China's favor as it is continuing its missile buildup, while Taiwan is still delaying purchases of US weapons.
But ironically China's leverage in the Taiwan Strait has weakened as a result of the more aggressive policies implemented by the Chen administration and the emergence of a Taiwanese identity.
Washington is the player in the least enviable position. In the past, it has successfully managed the contradictory task of backing Taiwan's democracy while letting an alliance with an authoritarian China prevail. Now Washington is under pressure from both China and Taiwan to alter its cross-strait policy.
Chen has built his career on dividing his opponents. He won the 1994 Taipei mayoral election and the 2000 presidential election in large part because of divisions within the KMT. Chen's recent initiatives tacitly aim at splitting the US and China in the hope that Washington will side with Taipei.
On the other hand, China's influence on the cross-strait outcome is declining as it realizes that rhetoric will only strengthen the Taiwanese pro-independence movement.
That's why Beijing is trying to regain leverage by asking Washington to state that it opposes Taiwanese independence.
Washington is facing what increasingly looks like a major foreign policy crisis, with officials from the National Security Council and the State Department currently fighting behind the scenes.
The US will have tough decisions to make, as neither Taiwan nor China seem willing to back down.
The US is the country that has everything to lose from a change in the status quo.
Trung Latieule is a freelance reporter based in Taipei.
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