For over a decade, US strategic thinking has focused on China's emergence as a great power in East Asia. Such thinking is passe. China is already East Asia's great power.
While the US has struggled in Iraq this year, China has spent the year on a diplomatic goodwill offensive in Asia. The result?
In October, one day after US President George W. Bush was booed in Australia's parliament, Chinese President Hu Jintao (
To be sure, the US remains Asia's powerbroker, as it has been since the end of World War II. But diplomacy regarding the Korean peninsula, in which all roads lead to Beijing, has opened the door to China as the new "go-to guy." Indeed, the six-party meetings in Beijing earlier this year to discuss North Korea's nuclear challenge confirmed China's emerging great power status, which is also reflected in its increasingly active -- and effective -- Asian diplomacy.
This includes even Japan, China's traditional rival. Last May, Hu met with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in St. Petersburg, Russia. Hu's move lifted bilateral relations out of the deep freeze, where China's previous leadership had consigned them following Koizumi's repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, where the spirits of Japan's war dead, including Class A war criminals, are enshrined.
Unlike former Chinese president Jiang Zemin (
In August, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda attended ceremonies in Beijing marking the 25th anniversary of the China-Japan Friendship Treaty. At the same time, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing (李肇星) traveled to Tokyo. In September, Japanese defense minister visited China, resuming high-level defense contacts.
If all goes well, a Koizumi visit to China may be in the offing. Koizumi has long sought an official visit, only to be stymied by Chinese opposition to his Yasukuni visits.
His interest is understandable. Last year, Japanese imports from China surpassed those from the US for the first time, while annual exports to China soared by 39.3 percent. Even as the SARS epidemic raged in China, Japanese companies kept their long-term investment bets on the promise of low-cost Chinese labor.
China has been equally active to its south and west. In June, during the ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh, China announced that it will sign the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, ASEAN's founding document.
China's accession to ASEAN represents a major confidence-building step toward Southeast Asia. It follows China's 2001 proposal for a China-ASEAN free trade zone and its active financial support for Thailand and Indonesia during the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. Talk of a "strategic partnership" is in the air.
Meanwhile in South Asia, after hosting Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Beijing, China and India signed a Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation. India acknowledges in the document that Tibet is part of China and proscribes anti-Chinese activities by Tibetans on Indian soil. Last month, the first-ever joint India-China naval exercises were held off the Chinese coast.
If the US is looking to develop a post-Cold War strategic relationship with India to counter Chinese influence in South and Southeast Asia, the recent China-India agreements suggests that an alternative strategic calculus may exist in both China and India. The US must recognize that, while the countries of the region look to the US to balance -- or at least leaven -- China's growing influence, they are unlikely to be interested in getting caught up in any containment strategy.
For now, US and Chinese interests coincide on the war on terrorism, on a peaceful resolution of the nuclear question on the Korean peninsula, and on stability in East Asia.
Over the long term, however, accommodation will be difficult on issues like Taiwan, Korean reunification and the future of the US alliance's structure in Asia. Moreover, on the fundamental issue of freedom -- "the non-negotiable demand of human dignity," in the words of the Bush administration's national security strategy -- US and Chinese visions conflict.
Clearly, the war on terrorism presented China with opportunities to strengthen both its relations with the US and its ties with nations across the Pacific. The big question is whether today's cooperation between China and the US will prove to be no more than a diversion from Asia's enduring strategic reality -- China's emergence as the region's dominant power.
The safest bet is that Asia's realities will outlast the war on terrorism, and that after Afghanistan and Iraq, when the US refocuses on Asia, it will find a very different China in a much-changed region.
James Przystup is senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the US National Defense University. He served on the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department and the Policy Planning Staff of the Secretary of Defense during the first Bush administration. The views expressed are his own.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
The Donald Trump administration’s approach to China broadly, and to cross-Strait relations in particular, remains a conundrum. The 2025 US National Security Strategy prioritized the defense of Taiwan in a way that surprised some observers of the Trump administration: “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.” Two months later, Taiwan went entirely unmentioned in the US National Defense Strategy, as did military overmatch vis-a-vis China, giving renewed cause for concern. How to interpret these varying statements remains an open question. In both documents, the Indo-Pacific is listed as a second priority behind homeland defense and
Every analyst watching Iran’s succession crisis is asking who would replace supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Yet, the real question is whether China has learned enough from the Persian Gulf to survive a war over Taiwan. Beijing purchases roughly 90 percent of Iran’s exported crude — some 1.61 million barrels per day last year — and holds a US$400 billion, 25-year cooperation agreement binding it to Tehran’s stability. However, this is not simply the story of a patron protecting an investment. China has spent years engineering a sanctions-evasion architecture that was never really about Iran — it was about Taiwan. The
For Taiwan, the ongoing US and Israeli strikes on Iranian targets are a warning signal: When a major power stretches the boundaries of self-defense, smaller states feel the tremors first. Taiwan’s security rests on two pillars: US deterrence and the credibility of international law. The first deters coercion from China. The second legitimizes Taiwan’s place in the international community. One is material. The other is moral. Both are indispensable. Under the UN Charter, force is lawful only in response to an armed attack or with UN Security Council authorization. Even pre-emptive self-defense — long debated — requires a demonstrably imminent
Since being re-elected, US President Donald Trump has consistently taken concrete action to counter China and to safeguard the interests of the US and other democratic nations. The attacks on Iran, the earlier capture of deposed of Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro and efforts to remove Chinese influence from the Panama Canal all demonstrate that, as tensions with Beijing intensify, Washington has adopted a hardline stance aimed at weakening its power. Iran and Venezuela are important allies and major oil suppliers of China, and the US has effectively decapitated both. The US has continuously strengthened its military presence in the Philippines. Japanese Prime
RSS