The cross-strait relationship between the US, Taiwan and China, is saturated with ambiguous wording. Another word has just been added. The relationship is so delicate that even a small word change can sprout another debate which sometimes can last over a long period of time. Pity a president when he meets Chinese leaders. He has been given another nuance he must remember on yet another volatile issue that is not at the top of his priorities.
US policy on the subject of Taiwan independence for many years was to avoid stating any position publicly except to simply say that it must be resolved by the two sides of the Taiwan Strait peacefully. Then, in 1995, there was continuous pressure from China to produce a fourth communique clearly stating American opposition to Taiwan independence. It was rejected (three communiques was considered headache enough).
In the same year, in a letter from then-president Bill Clinton to then-Chinese president Jiang Zemin (江澤民) meant to mollify China, it is believed that the National Security Council slipped in a statement that the US would "not support" Taiwan independence. (In at least two books, authored by well-known experts, the letter was said to use the word "oppose" independence but was modified in public to "non-support" thereafter).
There is a frequent temptation by policymakers to use words that are a little different than previous administrations used, by replacing them with words that maintain ambiguity but at the same time give the US some breathing space in maintaining its values for American consumption.
China (initially) uses the changed wording as a sign of progress for domestic political purposes. It works for a short period, but eventually Beijing presses for more clarity. If another communique is not acceptable, maybe a public statement from the American president perhaps? It's the next best thing.
They got it when Clinton went to China and publicly stated the "three noes." Perhaps this problem of "non-support" or "oppose" carries with it some jinx. Here we are again. In the meantime, the US has come to use the phrase "we don't support Taiwan independence," like the American "one China policy," as a sign to China that our policy remains the same. Predictably, they have been back pushing for more clarity.
They have been calling for a clear American statement that the US "opposes" Taiwan independence. Washington has said no, but inevitably came up with another ambiguity. According to a res-ponse in one State Departments press briefing: "we would be opposed to any referenda that would change Taiwan's status or move toward independence." It was clearly a purposefully stated position which apparently satisfied the policy makers that its ambiguity would not violate one of the US' important values -- use of referendum in a democratic society.
Ambiguity has been used again to get over a short term problem, and that continues to have its merits. But it also, as usual, carries with it some pretty difficult problems. First is the question of how to implement this policy in the future, and second is whether the US statement is setting some unwanted precedents.
A referendum vote by the people could demand a formal declaration of independence. While that would show clear enough what the people want, and Taiwan has for some time stated many times that it is already an independent sovereign country, there would still be legal obstacles to make it happen.
But there would be another problem before it ever gets to that stage: the embarrassment the referendum vote result would bring to the Chinese government. It would expose the fiction it has given to the people over decades that Taiwanese compatriots want to be part of China. US support to prevent that referendum vote makes the US a party to such subterfuge. That is just the beginning.
The hooker in the addendum to non-support of Taiwan independence is the phrase -- "move toward independence." Who decides what is a move toward independence? If we take China's interpretation, any referendum on anything would carry some movement toward independence, as people aren't supposed to make decisions through the ballot box. Clearly, the US can't accept that. The ambiguity is there now, however, and that might be helpful for the immediate future, but not in the longer term.
For Taiwan, almost any domestic political change can be legitimately interpreted as strengthening their democracy. In a democracy, changes in the law, or new ones, have been made and will continue to be made, continuously. That's what parliaments, Congress, or Legislative Yuans are all about. Which laws are "moves toward independence?" Will the US have to opine every law that China objects to as a move toward independence?
Here too the new addendum to Washington's Taiwan policy may be useful in getting past the present crisis, but its usefulness in the future is questionable.
China can, and probably will, challenge Taiwan domestic changes continuously. The US' present effort to resolve or at least lower tensions, if repeated continuously, however, better serves China than Taiwan. It puts limitations on the rights of the people of Taiwan with no quid pro quo on what China will do to lower tensions in return. America will be injecting itself in restraining Taiwan efforts to establish a stronger identity of its own, while doing little to restrain efforts by China to contain Taiwan's international participation.
Then there is the problem of precedents. China is openly asking the US to intercede with Taiwan. Washington apparently is doing so, though not seeking, entirely, what China is demanding. It is done in the name of lowering tensions in the Strait which, given US commitments, is legitimate. It is, however, very close to what the US has continuously stated it will not do -- ie, mediate between the two sides of the Strait.
In doing so, it weakens the pressure on China to dialogue with the leaders on Taiwan, which is the only sensible means of lowering tensions. It also comes close to breaking the third commitment in the six assurances -- the US "will not play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing."
In addition, the differences over Taiwan's use of a referendum to break the stalemate in the political process in that country is not the end of it. Part of that problem is very much connected to its Constitution.
The debate in Taiwan itself is not whether there should be changes made in the Constitution. All political parties agree on that. The difference is over whether there should be amendments or an entirely new constitution. Once again, China will only see the cross-strait element of any wording within the Constitution, and care little about (if not willfully encouraging) the difficulties of governing Taiwan.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group.The views expressed in this article are his own.
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