Much has been said about the extent of China's influence over what happens in North Korea. As it is, Beijing is as comfortable acting as the guarantor for the stability of a dictatorship as America is in overseeing the survival of democracy in Taiwan. And so it is that any assessment of Beijing's intents and responses to entreaties from the US, Japan or others to rein in Pyongyang cannot be separated from its intentions relating to Taiwan.
US President George W. Bush and his Cabinet colleagues have distanced themselves from the Korea policy of their predecessors in the Bill Clinton administration. Their purpose in doing so has been ridiculed as a petty affair that ranges from a shameless attempt to repudiate a rival political party or a dangerous act of unearthing cold-war zombies.
But the actions and statements from the Bush camp relating to the Korean Peninsula reflect a sense of realpolitick that is neither frivolous nor impulsive. Nor is it uninformed. Given the lousy record of the North Koreans, it would be more foolish for anyone facing them to be anything other than skeptical.
In all events, too much blood has been shed throughout history by appeasement that involves one-sided compromises. Even if all its neighbors may not agree, a unified Korea is certainly a desirable goal from the American vantage point. This would not be acceptable, however, at any price or in any form. A hostile takeover using armed forces that leads to an imposed dictatorial regime is certainly not in the interests of most interested parties.
The Bush position should not be seen as a repudiation of the ambitions of former president Kim Dae-jung whose "sunshine policy" reflected a sincere attempt to improve relations with Kim Jong-il. Introspection suggests that while the steps taken by the American side might cause short-run delays in the forward momentum, they foresee results that are surely in sync with the long-run goals of their allies in Seoul.
While Pyongyang perfected "ping-pong" diplomacy, it appears that Washington intends to employ a thoughtful combination of more conventional diplomatic games. This will involve a combination of parry and thrust, conciliation and confrontation.
For those who wring their hands over the posturing of the Bush team, they should consider one prima facie piece of evidence that it is the Bush team that is best positioned to pursue American interests. This is the fact that the three powers that have a pathological desire to contain the US spoke out openly in favor of an Al Gore presidency. Of course, these were China, Russia and France. They expected that it would be easier to roll a Gore team on issues when US interests were in conflict with their own.
North Korea continues to act up while Washington is distracted by conflict in Iraq. Pyongyang is playing provocative games that include threats of nuclear brinkmanship in hopes of wringing concessions from Washington and Seoul. Uncertainty arising from the geopolitical risk relating to North Korea has affected Japan's and Korea's financial markets.
Recently, it refused to participate in the unending talks conducted under the terms of the 1953 Korean War armistice. More troubling, Pyongyang withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and expelled international monitors. And then it threatened to restart a plutonium reprocessing facility.
While there have been delays in restarting the Yongbyon reprocessing site, perhaps due to technical difficulties, once underway that site could produce sufficient weapons-grade material to produce nuclear bombs within a few months. Once those steps are taken, it remains to be seen whether Pyongyang will consider conducting a nuclear test.
Unlike the long-range missile that North Korea fired over Japan in 1998, the latest missile test was a short-range surface-to-ship weapon that landed in the sea. But Pyongyang launched another missile on March 10, the day after Washington rejected its demand for direct talks. So far, the Bush administration has refused to talk directly with North Korea concerning its nuclear arms program, and has rejected Pyongyang's demands for such talks.
For its part, Washington insists that this is a regional, rather than a bilateral issue. The view is therefore that discussions should involve at least Seoul and Tokyo.
In any event, all pledges that Pyongyang makes concerning nuclear non-proliferation or non-aggression must be made verifiable by being supported by a viable and robust inspection regime. These promises must set performance standards that satisfy Washington, Seoul, Tokyo (and, perhaps, Moscow and Beijing).
The Clinton administration built upon the work of the George Bush Sr. presidency to arrange the 1994 Agreed Framework. This led to a freezing of Pyongyang's nuclear reprocessing to limit its ability to produce nuclear weapons. Absent effective means for checking on compliance, this deal has become a dead letter.
Bush and his White House team have forcefully changed both the style and substance of the US approach to engagement with Pyongyang. After all, bargaining from a strong position allows room to give up something that might not be so costly. Appeasement involves bargaining from a weakened position that can result in a much more dangerous disequilibrium for all parties.
Beijing gives up so much and gains so little from restraining its communist neighbor, which misbehaves like a rogue client. So it should be clear that it expects compensation for whatever assistance it eventually offers.
It should not be overlooked that China's bottom line in all its relations with the US relates to Taiwan. It would be a bad deal if the world loses one communist dictatorship, Pyongyang, while another one assumes control over Taipei.
Christopher Lingle is professor of economics at Universidad Francisco Marroquin in Guatemala and global strategist for eConoLytics.com.
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