The media recently reported that the US Pacific Command is to station a military team at Taiwan's Hengshan Military Command Center, under the Ministry of National Defense (MND), to participate in this year's Hankuang No. 19 exercise. How should we look upon this move by the US military?
Perhaps we can look at it from two perspectives. First, from a political perspective, the military provides the means of accomplishing certain political purposes. Washington's effort to strengthen military relations with Taipei sends a clear message to Beijing that US determination to ensure that cross-strait relations develop peacefully is resolute. The move enables the US to demonstrate its resolve more effectively than just by sending aircraft carrier groups to the Taiwan Strait once a crisis occurs. It also prevents China from misjudging the situation, minimizing the chances of a repeat of the 1996 missile crisis.
Moreover, the US can effectively solve its difficulties in deterring China by strengthening Taiwan's military forces. The goal of US deterrence against China is limited to the hope that China will handle the cross-strait issue in a peaceful way. Besides, from the point of view of the overall interests of the US, the cross-strait issue is irrelevant. China's goals in respect of the issue, by contrast, would seem to be both unlimited and sacred. They include the unification of the nation and the prevention of foreign interference, based on nationalism.
Although China would gain nothing from a Sino-US conflict, it would be a significant victory if it could somehow establish itself in an unassailable position vis-a-vis Taiwan. US decision-makers therefore have to take contingency measures to guard against the possible risks inherent in any attempt to deter China. From this perspective, the stronger the nation's military power, the greater its independence once a war breaks out. And the lower the risk of the US intervening in a cross-strait conflict.
Second, from a strategic perspective, the massive involvement that is planned for the US implies to a certain degree that there is much to be improved in Taiwan's military. In other words, Taiwan's military power has declined ever since it severed diplomatic relations with the US, a situation that can be reversed only by special measures. There are certain arenas in which this is especially obvious. The Taiwanese military's capacity to carry out joint warfare is perhaps the category that needs to be improved the most.
From another perspective, the US plan also reflects Washington's deep concern for the increase in Beijing's military strength. As everyone knows, Taiwan has been the target of China's large-scale military modernization ever since the 1996 missile crisis. The training and warfare capacities of the Chinese military are especially worrisome. By taking the exceptional measure of sending its own personnel to the Hengshan Military Command Center to participate in Taiwan's military exercise, the US hopes to bolster the country's military strength quickly.
Generally speaking, the current situation shows that military relations between Taipei and Washington have become closer. We should seize the opportunity to reform and modernize Taiwan's national defense system, and we should carefully handle Taiwan-US relations. In turn, we shold be careful to avoid giving the US the impression that we are abusing the close relations between our two countries, so that we don't undermine US confidence in Taiwan.
Arthur Ding is director of Research Division III at the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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