The recent signing of the new Taiwan-Hong Kong aviation pact seems to suggest that Taipei and Beijing are on the right track for establishing direct links. Some analysts even claim that the air accord could serve as a model for future cross-strait talks. But the fact is, China compromised with Taiwan over the "golden route" because it could easily, if it wishes, make the Hong Kong government a scapegoat for a weak deal.
Furthermore, the deal was struck under the watchful eye of the international community during the fifth anniversary of the British handover of Hong Kong.
In talks on direct links, Beijing will be negotiating directly with Taipei and would therefore have to take the blame for any mistakes. This is why dialogue on direct links promises to be much more problematic.
First, direct links are a divisive issue in cross-strait relations. Beijing uses the issue to deliberately sow discord between Taiwan's political parties. Beijing is well aware that the launching of direct shipping services with China would boost President Chen Shui-bian's (
Second, China's leadership will be under domestic pressure during the August meeting of high-level officials in Beidaihe, as they prepare for the transfer of power at the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party. It is unlikely that Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao (
Beijing's reply to Chen's offer last May to allow a DPP goodwill delegation in August will be a good indication of China's intentions.
Third, mutual distrust characterizes current cross-strait relations. The Straits Exchange Foundation has reported that Chinese authorities have rejected more than 5,000 notarized documents from Taiwan since the beginning of this year, in spite of the 1993 Koo-Wang agreement which dealt with the subject.
The difficulty of implementing the "small three links" shows what awaits Taipei in future cross-strait talks. Although Taiwan allowed direct trade, mail and transport between Kinmen and Matsu and Fujian Province starting in January last year, China continues to restrict visits to the two islands by approving or denying applications for direct shipping.
While the new Taiwan-Hong Kong aviation pact does not show that cross-strait talks will go smoothly, it nevertheless demonstrates the necessity of a pragmatic strategy for Taiwan.
The Chen administration has been emphasizing the principles of "dignity, parity and reciprocity" in its relations with China, adding that it refuses to be "downgraded, localized and marginalized." But to date, these good intentions have led only to foreign-policy failure. Taiwan has lost Macedonia as an ally. It failed to secure stopovers in Europe for the recent presidential trip to Africa and US officials said last week that a Chen visit to Washington is unlikely this year.
What Taiwan needs to do if it is to improve its international position is to develop its own form of realpolitik. The way in which the negotiations were conducted between Taiwan and Hong Kong could set the tone for a more realistic approach to cross-strait relations. If Taiwan and China want to achieve a breakthrough in direct links talks, they will both need to adopt flexible strategies and find face-saving mechanisms.
Taipei and Beijing could resort to the mechanism used in the aviation talks and dispatch business representatives to negotiate direct links, with officials orchestrating the talks, but serving as advisers only. Another option, given the sensitivity of the issue -- though it was once ruled out by the Mainland Affairs Council -- would be to send emissaries and secret envoys to facilitate talks.
The first concrete step then, once Taiwan and China have agreed on the negotiating parties, would be to define an agenda and, especially, to discuss the thorny issues of whether planes and ships should fly their national flags and whether direct cross-strait flights should be considered domestic or international.
As talks on direct links get underway, Taiwan must remain absolutely clear about what is actually at stake. Whatever gains the Chen administration made with the aviation pact, sovereignty is not at stake in negotiations on direct links. A deal would hardly translate into political benefits (unless China agreed to send officials), nor would it enhance Taiwan's international position. Taiwan's sovereignty is fundamentally a matter of the status afforded to the nation by the international community, not by China.
Taiwan has more to lose by stubbornly focusing on the sovereignty issue. Of course, it must not renounce its rights as a state, but it should not alienate the key foreign countries that might support its UN and WHO bids.
In the 21st century, companies act more and more as the spearheads of their country's foreign policy. The European Council of Commerce and Trade and the American and Japanese chambers of commerce have all urged the opening of direct links, because companies are keen to cut shipping costs and delivery times.
Lifting the ban on direct links would encourage foreign investment in Taiwan and deter multinational corporations from relocating their head offices to Shang-hai. What is at stake is Taiwan's future as a major transshipment hub in the Asia-Pacific region.
If Taiwan becomes economically marginalized, it will increasingly fail to attract the international community to its cause. Tai-wan's future depends on its trade.
While some might argue that a failure to win China's recognition of Taiwan's sovereignty in direct-links talks would be a major concession, a more realistic approach argues that Taiwan would still benefit by establishing the links on the basis of the status quo.
Opening direct links would introduce the virus of democracy and human rights to China and gradually undermine the Beijing regime by aggravating the contradiction between political authoritarianism and economic liberalization. Trade and economic cooperation could constitute powerful stimuli for political and social change.
The question is: Will the Chen administration be wise enough to adopt such a long-term view?
Trung Latieule is a former editorial assistant at the International Herald Tribune and is now a freelance reporter in Taipei.
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