At the recent press conference for his new book, President Chen Shui-bian (
The problem with their argument is that both Chen and his predecessor, Lee Teng-hui (
But could it be that Chen is in the wrong because Beijing has been insisting that the "one China" consensus of 1992 is the one and only foundation for the development of cross-strait relations? On this point, Taiwan's opposition parties have been acting like Beijing's mouthpieces. The "one China" principle and the 1992 consensus as Beijing understands them merely represent the political objectives that Beijing wants to achieve.
At a press conference during the recent APEC summit in Shanghai, China's Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan (
"One China, with each side making its own interpretation" is a semantic trap set up by Beijing. It is meant only for domestic consumption within China and for deceiving the people of Taiwan. Internationally, there is only enough room for one China, not for different interpretations of it.
For Taiwan, whether or not to accept "one China" is a matter of life and death. It is a question of whether Taiwan wants to accept "one country, two systems" and become a local government. For the people of Taiwan, this question is a choice between democracy or authoritarianism, human rights or despotism, rule of law or rule by whim. Certainly, for both the president and the people of Taiwan, the answer to Beijing's offer is "no." Taiwan's electorate must make its voice heard at the polls on Dec.1 -- by stripping the pan-blue camp of its legislative majority.
That the PRC and the ROC coexist is reality. How can anyone say that any consensus has been reached on "one China?" Beijing can bring up "one China" as an issue to be discussed, but to make it a precondition? To demand that Taiwan must surrender before any negotiations can begin? Don't even think about it, China -- nor its Quislings in Taiwan.
The conflict in the Middle East has been disrupting financial markets, raising concerns about rising inflationary pressures and global economic growth. One market that some investors are particularly worried about has not been heavily covered in the news: the private credit market. Even before the joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran on Feb. 28, global capital markets had faced growing structural pressure — the deteriorating funding conditions in the private credit market. The private credit market is where companies borrow funds directly from nonbank financial institutions such as asset management companies, insurance companies and private lending platforms. Its popularity has risen since
The Donald Trump administration’s approach to China broadly, and to cross-Strait relations in particular, remains a conundrum. The 2025 US National Security Strategy prioritized the defense of Taiwan in a way that surprised some observers of the Trump administration: “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.” Two months later, Taiwan went entirely unmentioned in the US National Defense Strategy, as did military overmatch vis-a-vis China, giving renewed cause for concern. How to interpret these varying statements remains an open question. In both documents, the Indo-Pacific is listed as a second priority behind homeland defense and
Every analyst watching Iran’s succession crisis is asking who would replace supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Yet, the real question is whether China has learned enough from the Persian Gulf to survive a war over Taiwan. Beijing purchases roughly 90 percent of Iran’s exported crude — some 1.61 million barrels per day last year — and holds a US$400 billion, 25-year cooperation agreement binding it to Tehran’s stability. However, this is not simply the story of a patron protecting an investment. China has spent years engineering a sanctions-evasion architecture that was never really about Iran — it was about Taiwan. The
In an op-ed published in Foreign Affairs on Tuesday, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) said that Taiwan should not have to choose between aligning with Beijing or Washington, and advocated for cooperation with Beijing under the so-called “1992 consensus” as a form of “strategic ambiguity.” However, Cheng has either misunderstood the geopolitical reality and chosen appeasement, or is trying to fool an international audience with her doublespeak; nonetheless, it risks sending the wrong message to Taiwan’s democratic allies and partners. Cheng stressed that “Taiwan does not have to choose,” as while Beijing and Washington compete, Taiwan is strongest when
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