Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr and Vietnamese President Vo Van Thuong on Tuesday met in Hanoi to sign two memorandums of understanding on security cooperation in the South China Sea, establishing a comprehensive partnership between their countries’ coast guards.
The two countries are among claimants to disputed islands, reefs, banks and other features in the region, and both have had run-ins with the Chinese Coast Guard.
“We are firm in defending our sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction against any provocations,” Marcos said before the meeting. “At the same time, we are also seeking to address these issues with China through peaceful dialogue and consultations as two equal sovereign states.”
China claims most of the South China Sea, and it has attempted to exercise control over an area that overlaps the exclusive economic zones of Taiwan, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. To assert its claims, Beijing has increasingly harassed the navies of the Philippines, Vietnam, the US, Australia and other countries in the international waters.
It is exceedingly important for all countries with interests in the region to cooperate and combat Chinese aggression.
It is promising to see Vietnam and the Philippines cooperating despite their competing claims, and they should work with other countries in the region as well. In an opinion piece published by Foreign Policy on Sept. 6 last year, former US National Security Council senior director for Asian affairs Michael Green said that an “Asian NATO” could eventually emerge.
US allies in Asia “could very well move in the direction of collective security ... if concerns about deterring and stopping a destructive and dangerous regional war surpass concerns about trade, regional cohesion, or retaining strategic autonomy,” he wrote.
Beijing’s coercive behavior against its neighbors could encourage such an alliance “even without any overt Chinese use of force,” he wrote.
Taipei would be an important strategic partner in a regional security pact given its proximity to China, the importance of the Bashi Channel and the Taiwan Strait to shipping and naval strategy, and Taiwan’s experience in countering Chinese aggression.
Ideally, Taiwan would upgrade its maritime ports to accommodate larger vessels, allow regional partners to access its territory and engage in joint military training with neighbors. The US holds regular joint drills with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, India and Australia. Taiwan should be invited to those drills, and there should be efforts to hold drills on a larger scale to incorporate more countries into simultaneous exercises.
In the South China Sea in particular, countries that agree to cooperate could share access to the islands, reefs and features they control, allowing each other’s vessels and aircraft to dock and land. This would be helpful in improving the efficacy of coast guard operations and helping secure the safe passage of commercial vessels.
Asia-Pacific countries have shied away from taking actions that could be interpreted as antagonistic toward China. However, if there were a coordinated response, China would be powerless to use economic coercion against those cooperating, without risking its own economic interests. China’s biggest export partners last year were the US (US$43.8 billion), Japan (US$13.3 billion) and South Korea (US$12.5 billion), while its biggest import partners were Taiwan (US$18.4 billion), South Korea (US$15 billion) and Japan (US$14.1 billion).
China might voice threats, but it is time that regional partners show Beijing that it has more to lose than gain through antagonism, and Taiwan can play a key role in containing its aggression.
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