Taipei Times: You are an economist with a strong "localization" consciousness; why did you work at the National Unification Council (NUC)?
Chang Jung-feng (張榮豐): I started to work at the Chung-hua Institution for Economic Research in 1980. In 1990 then-president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) asked me to work at the National Security Council. Then Lee said the NUC would soon be set up and that he wanted us to go there. That was the year when the student democracy movement took place in front of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall. Lee took the momentum to push for Taiwan's democratization. Many people who worked for him wondered why the NUC should be established at such a time when reforms should take precedence.
TAIPEI TIMES FILE PHOTO
Lee later explained his thoughts privately and said that martial law was imposed on Taiwan for a long time and cross-strait relations were categorically frozen. But once reforms were undertaken and the walls separating the two sides all torn down, then forces from China might come in to intervene in Taiwan's democratic reform. Therefore, [he thought] there must be a mechanism to keep China's influence away.
Lee said that the function of the NUC would be to set forth various preconditions and restrictions on the development of cross-strait relations.
Unification must be pursued in different stages, but no timetable was designated for each stage. That is, we called for an ultimate unification, but only in the indefinite future.
The NUC, according to Lee, was like a "wire net" that China could see through, but couldn't enter. And even pro-unification advocates would accept such a mechanism.
TT: During the 1996 presidential election, China launched missile exercises and caused tension across the Strait, trying to influence the result of the election. President Lee claimed that he had 18 plans to respond to various scenarios. Were you involved in the drafting of those plans?
Chang: I was involved, but I'd rather not give details of the process of the crisis management. All I can say is that the goals set by the NSC at that time were all achieved. To a certain extent we even turned the situation around and made the crisis a new opportunity for Taiwan to develop international cooperation, such as attracting international media attention and sympathy and expanding substantial relations with neighboring countries which share common interests with Taiwan. Many of the things that were done at that time still have their impact today.
TT: But cross-strait dialogue has since been suspended and pressure for the resumption of talks has mounted within Taiwan. How is the NSC going to resolve the deadlock?
Chang: Many Taiwan media and opposition politicians often fall into China's tactical traps. They put pressure on their own government and spread unwarranted anxiety because of an ostensible standoff and lack of communication mechanism.
The NSC is well aware of Beijing's thoughts. Unless China uses force, Beijing will have no choice but to come to the negotiation table before they can take Taiwan back. So "negotiation" is Beijing's underlying strategy and purposely avoiding negotiation is their tactic.
After the 1996 crisis, in November 1997 China sent an invitation to Chiao Jen-ho (
And when President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) took the presidency in 2000, Beijing took a tough stance and said that it would "listen to his words and observe his deeds." But when the DPP won a landslide victory in last December's legislative election, Beijing then said that it welcomed DPP members to visit the mainland.
It is pretty obvious that Beijing will have to return to its strategy of negotiation to deal with Taiwan. The rejection of talks is just used a means to create friction within Taiwan, but many media and politicians in Taiwan still fall into the trap.
TT: Taiwan may not need to dance to Beijing's tune, but refusing to conduct political negotiations with Beijing doesn't seem to be a viable option, either. How will the NSC prepare for its strategies when both sides sit down for political negotiation?
Chang: It is not that Taiwan cannot sit down for political negotiations with China. But our people should understand that, in a normal negotiation, two "interlocutors" negotiate for "the settlement of an object."
But in cross-strait negotiations, China's strategy is "to treat its interlocutor as the object." That is, it treats Taiwan as the object and negotiates for the "settlement" of Taiwan. In this way, only China will win without making any concessions.
So in the second Koo-Wang talks in Shanghai in 1992, we tried to shift the "object" of the talk from "Taiwan's future" to "China's democratization."
TT: Were you involved in the research of former President Lee Teng-hui's "special state-to-state relations" comments in 1999? How was the crisis resolved then?
Chang: President Lee set up a "unit for strengthening the ROC's sovereignty" at that time. Tsai Ing-wen (
Many members of the unit now are unwilling to admit that they were involved.
Even some of the politicians who were highly supportive of the statement at that time became highly critical of its effect. But I don't agree with them.
I think the "special state-to-state relations" statement had profound significance and history will have a fair judgment on that.
LOUD AND PROUD Taiwan might have taken a drubbing against Australia and Japan, but you might not know it from the enthusiasm and numbers of the fans Taiwan might not be expected to win the World Baseball Classic (WBC) but their fans are making their presence felt in Tokyo, with tens of thousands decked out in the team’s blue, blowing horns and singing songs. Taiwanese fans have packed out the Tokyo Dome for all three of their games so far and even threatened to drown out home team supporters when their team played Japan on Friday. They blew trumpets, chanted for their favorite players and had their own cheerleading squad who dance on a stage during the game. The team struggled to match that exuberance on the field, with
Taiwanese paleontologists have discovered fossil evidence that pythons up to 4m long inhabited Taiwan during the Pleistocene epoch, reporting their findings in the international scientific journal Historical Biology. National Taiwan University (NTU) Institute of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology associate professor Tsai Cheng-hsiu (蔡政修) led the team that discovered the largest snake fossil ever found in Taiwan. The single trunk vertebra was discovered in Tainan at the Chiting Formation, dated to between 400,000 and 800,000 years ago in the Middle Pleistocene, the paper said. The area also produced Taiwan’s first avian fossil, as well as crocodile, mammoth, saber-toothed cat and rhinoceros fossils, it said. Discoveries
Taiwanese paleontologists have discovered fossil evidence that pythons up to 4m long inhabited Taiwan during the Pleistocene epoch, reporting their findings in the international scientific journal Historical Biology. National Taiwan University (NTU) Institute of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology associate professor Tsai Cheng-hsiu (蔡政修) led the team that discovered the largest snake fossil ever found in Taiwan. A single trunk vertebra was discovered in Tainan at the Chiting Formation, dated to between 800,000 to 400,000 years ago in the Middle Pleistocene, the paper said. The area also produced Taiwan’s first avian fossil, as well as crocodile, mammoth, sabre-toothed cat and rhinoceros fossils, it said. Discoveries
Whether Japan would help defend Taiwan in case of a cross-strait conflict would depend on the US and the extent to which Japan would be allowed to act under the US-Japan Security Treaty, former Japanese minister of defense Satoshi Morimoto said. As China has not given up on the idea of invading Taiwan by force, to what extent Japan could support US military action would hinge on Washington’s intention and its negotiation with Tokyo, Morimoto said in an interview with the Liberty Times (sister paper of the Taipei Times) yesterday. There has to be sufficient mutual recognition of how Japan could provide
RSS