With William Lai’s (賴清德) presidential inauguration coming up on May 20, both sides of the Taiwan Strait have been signaling each other, possibly about re-opening lines of communication. For that to happen, there are two ways this could happen, one very difficult to achieve and the other dangerous.
During his presidential campaign and since Lai has repeatedly expressed his hope to re-establish communication based on equality and mutual respect, and even said he hoped to meet with Chinese leader Xi Jinping (習近平) over beef noodles and bubble tea. More dramatically, as explored in the May 2 edition of this column, current vice premier and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) heavyweight Cheng Wen-tsan (鄭文燦) will head the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) for the incoming administration.
While it is possible that this nominal demotion could be due to political infighting, Cheng took the position, so it is more likely that Lai chose such a powerful figure with the ear of the top leadership to be the unofficial representative to China because it sends the signal that his administration is taking working with China very seriously. The SEF is a nominally private but government-funded organization established as a fig leaf to avoid “official” government interactions and represents the official Mainland Affairs Council (MAC).
Photo: Taipei Times file
In the May 9 edition of this column we examined how the Chinese Communist Party (CPP) is signaling to Taiwan by ramping up both carrots and sticks, highlighting the costs of no communication and the potential benefits of restarting talks. Increasingly aggressive “gray zone” military tactics are rising, especially around Kinmen, flybys at closer distances and unilaterally changing flight routes are the sticks.
Following the visit of a 17-member strong delegation of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers led by caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (傅?萁) to China in late April, as usual the Chinese side lifted some self-imposed restrictions on Taiwanese products imposed previously to express displeasure with the administration of President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文).
Usually these “rewards” for the KMT are the lifting of import bans of a handful of agricultural or fishery products, usually with a market value the hundreds of thousands or low millions of dollars. They did that this time, but for an unusually large group of 16 products.
Photo: Chen Wen-chan, Taipei Times
However, they also indicated that they wanted to roll back their self-imposed restrictions on Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan, and called on Taiwan to once again allow ferry service to operate across the strait and to ramp up direct flights to destinations across China that had withered away due to low traffic. This is a huge signal, as when they cut off tourism in the late 2010s, Taiwan’s inbound tourism revenue plunged by around US$4 billion.
BACKGROUND
Readers aware of the background may wish to jump to the next section.
The two sides began talking to each other in a series of meetings in 1992 and 1993 between the SEF and China’s equivalent unofficial fig leaf Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). Apparently nobody at the SEF or ARATS can count, as there is a grand total of one Taiwan Strait.
ARATS represents the official Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), which ultimately takes its marching orders from the CCP Central Leading Small Group for Taiwan Work (中央對台工作領導小組), which is chaired by party Secretary General Xi Jinping (習近平) with longtime shaper of party ideology Wang Huning (王滬寧) as second in command.
In 2000 a new way of thinking about China and the CCP took hold in the KMT, and they wanted to reopen talks on opening up to China but needed a fig leaf to get around their Republic of China (ROC) ideology. In 2000, then head of the MAC, Su Chi (蘇起), invented the term “1992 consensus” based on a fictitious consensus reached at those early meetings.
This was what the KMT had been looking for, and the party took up using the term. Eventually the CCP began to use it as well.
Ironically, in spite of it being in the name, there is no consensus between the KMT and the CCP as to what it means. The KMT’s version is that there is only one China and Taiwan is a part of it, but “each side has its own interpretation,” meaning that the ROC and People’s Republic of China (PRC) differ on what constitutes “China.”
The CCP has never endorsed or used the “each side has its own interpretation,” and as far as they are concerned Taiwan is a part of the PRC. In a January 2019 speech, Xi appeared to tie the “one country, two systems” nominally in place in Hong Kong to the “1992 consensus,” which the KMT came out strongly against. During the KMT-led administration of Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) the CCP’s position hardened and insisted all communications between both sides must be based on the “1992 consensus.”
When Tsai became president, the Chinese side cut off all direct communication due her refusal to recognize the “1992 consensus.” The DPP refuses to accept it because baked within it is the “one China principle.”
The CCP and KMT both follow the “one China principle,” which is that Taiwan is a part of China, period. This is different than the “one China policy” employed by many countries, which, stripped of the fancy wording, means “we are aware that China thinks Taiwan is part of China” but does not actually state that is true. The DPP never wants Taiwan to be part of the PRC, though the party does accept that Taiwan is in the ROC, which is an independent state using that name.
A ‘NO INDEPENDENCE CONSENSUS’
Ultimately, the CCP is not wedded to the “1992 consensus.” What the party is really wedded to is the “one China principle” embedded within it. Many have suggested that perhaps another formulation could be created.
To restart talks between the SEF and ARATS would be tricky as president-elect Lai will never accept the “1992 consensus” or any similar formulation that has the “one China principle” embedded in it, while for over a decade the CCP has insisted on it as a precondition for any talks.
If the CCP decides to be more flexible, there is one possible route that they might accept, something along the lines of a “no independence consensus.” This the CCP might be able to sell to their “little pink” nationalist base as meaning that Lai has declared he will not declare independence from China so therefore by extension that means he is accepting the “one China principle.”
Lai has already repeatedly stated he has no intention of “declaring independence” because he agrees with Tsai’s stance that the Republic of China, Taiwan is already an independent nation, so there is no need to “declare independence.” In other words, a “no independence consensus” would mean very different things to each side and would communicate it their own ways to their respective populations.
Whether something like this could or will happen is hard to say at this point, but with both sides appearing to have some interest in reopening communications it is possible. Watch this space closely.
THE INSIDIOUS BOILED FROG PATH
The other, far more dangerous and insidious path the CCP could take would be to attempt to use the KMT to coopt the SEF, and communicate and negotiate entirely through this one political party. To a minor degree this is already the case, but they could ramp this up on a grand scale.
Doing so would drive a huge wedge into Taiwan’s politics. Most polling suggests that Taiwanese would prefer better relations with China, and might be susceptible to the argument that the KMT would be promoting peace with China by keeping negotiations open and it could be a big boon for the economy. This could put tremendous public pressure on the Lai government to accept the deals that the KMT might make with the CCP.
It would do nothing to actually promote peace. The CCP’s main focus and function is to maintain domestic control in China. If or when their calculus is that attacking Taiwan would be more beneficial to maintaining domestic power than not doing so, is when they will strike.
The voters elected Lai as president and gave the DPP an unprecedented third term in office in large part because the public trusts the DPP to protect Taiwan’s independence and sovereignty. If the CCP uses the KMT in place of the SEF, this would be the opposite of what the voters intended.
Additionally, the elected government needs to bring together the MAC, the military, the national security apparatus, the Ministry of Economics and other relevant players to formulate an overall national strategy that takes these things into account. The KMT simply cannot do that, and would be playing fast and loose with Taiwan’s sovereignty, national security and economy.
It is possible that cooler heads within the KMT would recognize this and turn down such an offer from the Chinese side. However, it is entirely possible that the CCP would not do it all in one go, but rather would slowly ratchet it up like boiling a frog so the KMT would not even be aware of what was happening.
This may already be happening as the big jump in “rewards” from the latest KMT delegation visit demonstrates. If this pattern continues, then this theory is correct.
And that would be a very dangerous outcome.
Donovan’s Deep Dives is a regular column by Courtney Donovan Smith (石東文) who writes in-depth analysis on everything about Taiwan’s political scene and geopolitics. Donovan is also the central Taiwan correspondent at ICRT FM100 Radio News, co-publisher of Compass Magazine, co-founder Taiwan Report (report.tw) and former chair of the Taichung American Chamber of Commerce. Follow him on X: @donovan_smith.
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