The statement issued by the G7 on Wednesday last week again expressed opposition to any attempts to unilaterally change the “status quo” in the East China Sea, South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. Appearing for the sixth consecutive year, this language has evolved from an international statement to a warning about regional security. The challenge lies in turning this consensus into tangible defense progress that Taiwan can demonstrate.
What is particularly notable about this statement is that it combines the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea and South China Sea into a single Indo-Pacific security issue. China has used military aircraft, coast guard vessels, government vessels and other “gray zone” tactics to press deeper into surrounding waters, with the aim of fragmenting disputes into smaller, isolated incidents and mislead other countries into believing that they are nothing more than localized skirmishes. By grouping the three bodies of water together, the G7 is reminding all nations that the Taiwan Strait has become a testing ground for the rules-based order.
Neither the Presidential Office, the Executive Yuan nor the Legislative Yuan should interpret the G7’s statement as a security guarantee. International partners can express their stance, coordinate policy, provide military equipment and raise the costs of any use of force or coercion by China.
However, the first to bear the pressure in the event of a crisis would still be the Taiwanese public, military, coast guard and critical infrastructure. If the nation continues to treat defense spending, maritime law enforcement, energy security and cybersecurity as routine policy matters, then no matter how clear allies’ support might be, Beijing would still perceive Taiwan as lacking internal resolve.
The controversy surrounding negotiations over the exclusive economic zones of Japan and the Philippines serves as a reminder for Taiwan that pressure from China in the Indo-Pacific region should not be dissected into a series of isolated incidents. President William Lai (賴清德) on Friday last week said that the negotiations between Tokyo and Manila “cannot and will not affect the rights of a third country under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,” and that the biggest risk is China using law enforcement as a pretext for military expansion.
His remarks shift attention back to the party actually exerting the pressure. If Taiwan misinterprets coordination among democratic partners as a loss of sovereignty, it risks helping China divide the First Island Chain. Only by clarifying fishing rights, coast guard operations, notification mechanisms and international law can Taiwan demonstrate to neighboring countries that it is a responsible and cooperative partner.
From the G7 statement to the visit last week by a US House of Representatives delegation, the direction of Taiwan’s allies is increasingly clear. The visiting members — US Representatives Lucy McBath and Valerie Foushee — emphasized that Taiwan’s security is closely tied to the credibility of the US’ global commitments.
That message serves as a reminder to Taiwan: If allies’ commitments are to be credible, Taiwan’s own preparations must be credible. The government should provide concrete timelines for defense spending, coast guard patrol and protection capabilities, cybersecurity measures and civil defense training.
The Legislative Yuan should carefully review and approve the budgets on a case-by-case basis, rather than allowing partisan calculations to hinder deterrence capabilities.
For the sixth consecutive year, the G7 has issued a warning that peace across the Taiwan Strait has become a matter of international order, and that this warning has long transcended the level of isolated news.
What Taiwan should demonstrate to the world is something that would force China to reassess the cost of coercion, reassure allies of cooperation and allow the public to see concrete progress in defense preparations.
Steve Ho is a retired engineer.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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