As Air Force One prepares to descend into Beijing for a summit overshadowed by wars in Iran and Ukraine, much of the international discussion has centered on whether Taiwan could become part of a geopolitical bargain.
Speculation has intensified over possible adjustments in US policy language, arms sales or diplomatic signaling toward Taipei. For many observers, the summit is being framed as a test of whether Washington’s commitment to Taiwan would hold. However, Beijing appears to be studying something far broader.
While the US debates diplomatic wording, China is closely examining the strategic lessons from the wars in Iran and Ukraine. The focus is not limited to missiles or battlefield tactics. Beijing is watching how modern conflicts reshape societies, alliances, markets and political resolve long before formal war begins. The real lesson Beijing sees in Iran and Ukraine is that exhaustion can achieve what escalation cannot.
Remarks by former senior US defense officials reflect growing concern in Washington that China’s Taiwan strategy might increasingly rely on “gray zone” pressure, cognitive warfare and disruption campaigns designed to weaken political cohesion over time rather than trigger immediate military confrontation.
Retired US lieutenant general S. Clinton Hinote warned that Beijing is likely studying how propaganda, social media manipulation and public uncertainty could influence democratic societies during crises.
Former US assistant secretary of defense Ely Ratner similarly said China might seek to pressure Taiwan “without firing a shot,” relying instead on cognitive warfare and expanded “gray zone” activities.
Elements of this approach are already visible across the Indo-Pacific region.
Japan faced coordinated disinformation campaigns after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s comments on Taiwan. Australia has repeatedly warned about foreign interference and online influence operations. Taiwan itself continues to experience near-daily military pressure, cyberattacks, disinformation efforts and economic coercion, operating simultaneously below the threshold of open conflict.
At the same time, Beijing is studying the economic dimensions of modern war.
Over the past few weeks, oil tankers have rerouted, insurance markets have tightened and global supply chains have once again been reminded how quickly strategic pressure could spread far beyond the battlefield. The disruption surrounding the Strait of Hormuz has demonstrated how even limited instability could generate outsized political and economic effects.
For Taiwan, these lessons carry particular significance.
China might not need an immediate invasion scenario to place Taiwan under severe pressure. The nation might not wake up one morning to the sight of an invasion fleet crossing the Taiwan Strait. Pressure could instead emerge gradually: delayed cargo shipments, restricted air routes, cyberdisruptions, rising insurance costs and a constant stream of online narratives questioning whether resistance is sustainable.
This possibility matters, because democracies often struggle with prolonged ambiguity. Gradual pressure rarely produces the same urgency as open conflict. Political divisions deepen. Economic actors become cautious. International attention drifts. Public fatigue accumulates.
That dynamic is especially important as China watches the growing strain on US resources and political focus from simultaneous crises in Europe and the Middle East.
This is why Taiwan should avoid viewing the summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) solely through the lens of diplomatic concessions or symbolic wording changes.
Taiwan’s greatest challenge might not arrive as a sudden invasion, but emerge gradually — through shipping disruptions, rising insurance costs, information warfare, political hesitation and growing uncertainty over whether democracies can sustain collective resolve under pressure.
By the time a crisis is formally recognized, the economic pressure, political hesitation and psychological fatigue could already be deeply embedded.
The Taiwan Strait might become the first place where blockade effects appear long before anyone formally calls it a blockade.
Bonnie Yushih Liao is an assistant professor in Tamkang University’s Department of Diplomacy and International Relations.
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