Maritime strike drills on a Philippine island near Taiwan are part of this year’s US-Philippines Balikatan military exercises, international media reported.
The exercises, which began on Monday and are to run through May 8, are the largest ever in terms of participating countries, with Australia taking part once more, and Canada, France, New Zealand and Japan joining as active participants for the first time. The expansion underscores Manila’s widening network of security partnerships.
Manila and Washington are also for the first time to hold maritime strike drills on Itbayat Island, the Philippines’ northernmost territory, about 155km south of Taiwan, although US Marines and Philippine forces conducted combat-readiness drills on Itbayat during the 2024 Balikatan exercises. This year’s drills highlight the strategic importance of the area as tensions over Taiwan continue.
China has repeatedly criticized the Philippines for holding defense drills with allies, saying such activities risk heightening regional tensions.
Asked about the latest exercises at a regular briefing, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Guo Jiakun (郭嘉昆) said the Asia-Pacific region needs peace and stability, not outside forces creating division and confrontation.
“We would like to remind the relevant countries that persisting in tying themselves together on security will only lead to setting themselves on fire and backfiring,” Guo said.
US Marine Lieutenant General Christian Wortman said that the drills had “no target nation” in mind.
Nevertheless, developments in recent years point clearly to a growing regional effort to deter Chinese expansionism. They include US-led drills in Batanes, Philippines, Japan’s deployment of long-range missiles on Yonaguni Island in Okinawa Prefecture, the strengthening of security groupings such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the AUKUS grouping of Australia, the UK and the US, as well as NATO’s increasing engagement in the Indo-Pacific region.
China’s reactions only reinforce the reason for the uptick in activity. Beijing’s repeated denunciations suggest it recognizes that the measures are responses to its own assertiveness.
Drills in Batanes, across the Bashi Channel from Taiwan, can only be understood in the context of a Taiwan contingency. In wartime, control of the channel would be critical to naval movement between the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean.
The more important question is why Taiwan itself is not invited to participate in exercises such as Balikatan and KAMANDAG, a US-Philippines drill heavily focused on contingency scenarios involving Taiwan.
The formal explanation is that Taiwan is not a treaty ally of either the US or the Philippines, and that engagement with Taiwan remains constrained by the “one China” policy.
However, that argument is wearing thin. The US already supplies Taiwan with weapons and trains some Taiwanese military personnel on US-made systems such as missiles, radar and aircraft. Taiwanese units reportedly receive training in Guam or at US facilities under third-country or contractor arrangements. The US also has an advisory presence in Taiwan.
Taiwan also takes part in US-designed simulations and tabletop exercises. Taiwan scenarios are incorporated into planning for engagements in the Indo-Pacific region, while intelligence and operational coordination is quietly done through unofficial channels.
The US does not formally recognize Taiwan as a sovereign military partner and public joint drills could be portrayed by Beijing as a de facto alliance, so strategic ambiguity has long been used to manage escalation risks. Yet exercises built around a Taiwan contingency are increasing, not diminishing. Excluding Taiwan from them is getting difficult to justify.
Taiwan’s direct participation would significantly improve the realism and effectiveness of the drills. A mission aimed at deterring or responding to a Chinese attack would depend heavily on close coordination with Taiwanese forces already on the front line.
Expanded cooperation would also improve public confidence in Taiwan at a time when some question how far US support would extend, particularly as Washington remains engaged in conflicts elsewhere.
It would also give practical substance to repeated US statements opposing unilateral changes to the “status quo” across the Taiwan Strait.
Taiwan should press for greater participation in regional military exercises. Involvement need not constitute diplomatic recognition of sovereignty. It would instead reflect a realistic extension of security cooperation.
Beijing is going to protest, as it always does. Yet China continues military intimidation of Taiwan despite international objections. Its complaints about others preparing to preserve peace carry little credibility.
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