Swiftly following the conclusion of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun’s (鄭麗文) China trip, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office unveiled 10 new policy measures for Taiwan.
The measures, covering youth exchanges, agricultural and fishery imports, resumption of certain flights and cultural and media cooperation, appear to offer “incentives” for cross-strait engagement. However, viewed within the political context, their significance lies not in promoting exchanges but in redefining who is qualified to represent Taiwan in dialogue with China.
First, the policy statement proposes a “normalized communication mechanism” between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This would shift cross-strait interaction from government-to-government negotiations to party-level engagement.
The issue is that aviation rights, quarantine rules, tourism and infrastructure fall within public authority and should be handled through formal, reciprocal mechanisms. Instead, China is pushing a policy with KMT endorsement, seeking to bypass Taiwan’s democratically elected government through alternative political channels.
Second, the 10 measures continue Beijing’s practice of “selective opening.” Agricultural and fishery access and food market provisions come with political preconditions. This ties economic opportunity to political positions, destabilizing markets and exposing Taiwanese businesses to risk.
While Beijing can open access quickly, it can also restrict it under administrative or technical pretexts, making such “incentives” potential structural vulnerabilities.
Third, the timing coincides with Taiwan’s upcoming local elections in November. Through KMT-CCP engagement, Beijing signals that if its political conditions are accepted, exchanges and benefits could resume, while implying the current government is responsible for the deadlock.
This framing deepens political polarization in Taiwan and reflects Beijing’s united front strategy.
The deeper issue is that the KMT-CCP meeting and the 10 measures erode the institutional basis for equal cross-strait interaction.
When parties replace the government as the primary channel, when exchanges are tied to unilateral political conditions and when Beijing can decide who represents Taiwan, democratic mandate and institutional legitimacy are weakened. Without equality, peace and progress become an illusion.
Wang Hung-jen is a professor in National Cheng Kung University’s Department of Political Science.
Translated by Gilda Knox Streader
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