The war in the Middle East shows little sign of ending. Contradictory statements from Washington and Tehran about negotiations and timelines have made it difficult to assess the trajectory of the conflict. What is clear is that the war is continuing without a defined end, while its costs continue to mount.
For Taiwan, much of the attention has understandably focused on military lessons.
Since the start of the Ukraine war in 2022, analysts have been closely following how modern conflicts are fought, with discussions often centered on drones and loitering munitions, enhancing air defense systems, and expanding cooperation with the US, Israel and European partners.
Another aspect of modern conflicts deserves equal attention: the cost and sustainability of modern warfare.
Iran’s strategy relies heavily on volume. It launches numerous relatively inexpensive drones and missiles to overwhelm advanced air defense systems operated by Israel, the US and their regional partners. Official figures suggest that interception rates exceed 95 percent, yet the cost imbalance is striking.
Iranian drones and missiles are significantly cheaper than the interceptor systems fired to stop them. More than 5,000 munitions were launched in the first four days of the conflict, rising to about 11,000 within 16 days, Foreign Policy Research Institute estimates showed. Each interception consumes expensive and often limited defensive resources.
The imbalance becomes more pronounced when examining stockpiles. In the early stages of the conflict, the US reportedly used hundreds of Tomahawk cruise missiles and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system interceptors, which are not easily replaced at scale. The US had to redeploy THAAD units from South Korea to the region, highlighting that modern warfare is logistically demanding and financially costly.
Another dimension that receives less attention in Taiwan is how conflicts shape the development and validation of military technology. In my professional and academic roles, I have had the opportunity to observe a weapon development program firsthand. Conflicts like this are effectively testbeds for new weapon systems. For that reason, defense contractors and industry professionals often see them as opportunities.
Since 2024, Taiwan has signed many memoranda of understanding on drone development with international partners, mainly from the US and Europe. Taiwanese companies are also showcasing their products at international exhibitions. These are important steps, especially for entering global markets such as Europe.
However, without follow-through, the effect of the efforts remains limited.
Nobody would wear brand-new hiking shoes on a long and demanding hike. Instead, they would test them in safer conditions, such as wearing them for a walk in Daan Park or on a trip to the grocery store.
That helps identify discomfort or potential issues before relying on them in more demanding situations.
The same logic applies to weapon systems. Taiwanese drones need real-world use to acquire high-quality feedback about their performance, limitations and reliability. Simulations and peacetime deployments are useful, but from engineering and operational standpoints, they are not enough.
Modern conflicts provide clear examples. Before 2022, Ukraine was not widely seen as a leading drone power, yet today it has developed significant expertise, with its systems and operators being deployed abroad, including efforts to counter Iran’s Shahed drones. Turkey has followed a similar trajectory, using multiple combat experience to refine its drone platforms and expand exports.
Shahed drones have been used in multiple conflicts and have proven effective in saturating high-end air defense systems. Even the US has adapted the approach by developing low-cost uncrewed combat attack systems to complement its capabilities.
At the same time, conflicts are exposing strains in defense supply chains. High consumption rates of munitions, combined with limited production capacity, are putting pressure on stockpiles. That might open opportunities for new suppliers, particularly those able to offer cost-effective and scalable solutions.
Taiwan is well positioned in that regard, given its technological base and partnerships.
However, moving from development to credibility requires more than attending exhibitions or signing agreements. It requires systems that are not only designed well, but also tested, refined and trusted under demanding conditions.
Although it is highly valuable to promote a “China free” supply chain, that alone might not be sufficient to access larger markets. For Taiwanese defense companies, the challenge is to show tangible operational value. Given Taiwan’s close relations with the US and Israel, and the growing strain on their munition’s stockpiles, there might be room for Taiwan to step up and obtain meaningful combat feedback.
Harun Talha Ayanoglu is a visiting research fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research.
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