Since the legislative session began in February 2024, the level of conflict and political disarray have continued to escalate. With their combined majority, the opposition parties have turned the Legislative Yuan into an arena of decisions without debate, pushing through one absurd bill after another and cornering the Cabinet into submission.
Even the Constitutional Court, meant to safeguard the nation’s free and democratic constitutional order, was targeted by the legislature. Between raising the official quorum and blocking the government’s nominations for grand justices to fill vacancies to meet said quorum, the court was effectively paralyzed for nearly a full year.
In December last year, the Executive Yuan moved to stop the onslaught of absurd legislation being promulgated by refusing to countersign for the first time. In that same month, the five sitting grand justices of the Constitutional Court ruled that the amendments to the Constitutional Court Procedure Act (憲法訴訟法) — which raised the quorum — passed by the opposition-controlled legislature were unconstitutional, ending its period of de facto limbo.
Despite being four months into the fiscal year already, the central government’s annual budget has been stuck in a bottleneck for more than seven months, with the legislature yet to refer it to a committee for review. Where, then, do we go from here? In accordance with Article 30 of the Budget Act (預算法), the Executive Yuan has already set the direction for administrative policies for the next fiscal year in nine months’ time. Over the next few months, each competent authority would submit their individual policy plans, including income and expenditure estimates, to the Executive Yuan for approval. In August, the Executive Yuan must send its central government budget proposal for the following year to the legislature for review. If the spectacle of two separate annual budgets simultaneously pending legislative go-ahead comes to pass, it would be a first in the history of Taiwan’s fiscal governance.
Finances are the precursor to operational governance, and key to the welfare of the people. Article 54 of the Budget Act allows for a number of temporary budgets to be disbursed based on the previous fiscal year, preventing government agencies from shutting down entirely. However, this allows no flexibility for new expenditure items or projects, which stalls government initiatives.
Ultimately, authority over the nation’s fiscal governance lies with the executive branch, and public funds are held in its coffers. In this extraordinary period the legislature’s refusal to review the annual budget has given rise to, the Executive Yuan must also be willing to take extraordinary measures to salvage the situation and respond to the changing political landscape.
Lo Cheng-chung is a professor and director of Southern Taiwan University of Science and Technology’s Institute of Financial and Economic Law.
Translated by Gilda Knox Streader
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